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ABSTRACT

Proceedings are presented from a conference convened to examine recent developments in China and to provide recommendations for U.S. policy options vis a vis China. Participants included Asian American scholars, college and high school teachers, foreign policy experts, congressmen, and representatives from business, religious, and agricultural communities. The document is presented in two major sections, corresponding to the two major conference panels. Speeches in section I, domestic developments in China, are entitled "Political Trends and Leadership Changes," "Domestic and Foreign Economic Policy Issues," and "Rural Life and Social Change." Topics discussed include the succession of Mao Tse-tung, economic growth, foreign financial assistance, foreign trade, and changes in family life. Speeches in section II focus on the future of relations between the United States and China. They are entitled "Some Historical Perspectives," "Normalization: What do We Win? What do We Lose?" "Normalization: Multilateral Implications," "Taiwan: Future Options," and "U.S. Policy Toward China--A Congressional View." Topics include American and Chinese views of China, China and Russia, Chinese politics, and diplomatic relations. For each speech, information is presented on background and affiliation of the author, major subject headings, and a summary of the speech. (DB)

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DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

Proceedings of the Wisconsin Conference on China May 13-14, 1977

SD011 752

INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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FOREWORD

Ever since former President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1971 and the issuance of the joint U.S.-Chinese "Shanghai Communiqué" in 1972, both the domestic developments in the People's Republic of China and its relations with the rest of the world have become a matter of concern to the United States. As a nation consisting of over 900 million people, or approximately one-fourth of the world's population, China merits our attention in its own right. But even more, along with Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States, the People's Republic of China has emerged as the fourth major power in East Asia and as a key factor affecting the stability of that region. In addition, the PRC's approach to economic and social development--the "China Model"--has been regarded by several of the developing countries of the Third World as a possible prototype for their own developmental policies.

For these reasons and because the issue of U.S. relations with China may soon move nearer to the top of the foreign policy agenda of the United States, the Institute of World Affairs of The University of Wisconsin--Milwaukee decided to co-sponsor a statewide conference on China in cooperation with The China Council of The Asia Society, Inc., and with the financial support of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation of

Dayton, Ohio, and The Johnson Foundation of Racine, Wisconsin. The conference opened on Friday evening, May 13, 1977, with a slide presentation and "A Charge to the Panels" by Robert G. Chollar which was based on observations and questions raised during his recent visit to China with the world affairs delegation led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. It continued on Saturday with two consecutive panels--one on "Domestic Developments in China" and the other on "The Future of U.S.-China Relations" and concluded with a luncheon address on "U.S. Policy Toward China: A Congressional View" by Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations. Approximately 170 people attended the conference, with 150 attending the Friday dinner and Saturday luncheon.

In addition to the public conference, three concurrent roundtables were held on Saturday afternoon, each aimed at specially invited clientele. About thirty-five members of the Wisconsin Citizens Cabinet on U.S. Foreign Policy (consisting of leading representatives from business, industry, labor, banking, religious groups, civic volunteer organizations, minority groups, local and state government, the media, agriculture, and academia) met to discuss U.S. policy options vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China. A select group of Wisconsin businessmen attended a briefing-discussion on "Sino-American Trade:

Possibilities and Problems," and a number of high school teachers also met in a workshop on "Chinese Studies in the Secondary Schools."

The newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, sent a telegram which was read to the conference at the luncheon meeting with Congressman Zablocki. It stated in part: "As you begin your 'Wisconsin Conference on China' I want to say once again that . . . the conference is an excellent idea: the topic could not be more important; you could not have a better or more important speaker than Chairman Zablocki; and you have selected the kind of audience that we must engage in foreign policy discussions. . . . We have already stated publicly that we wish to move forward towards normalization of relations with PRC within the framework of the Shanghai Communiqué. We cannot lay out a timetable or a specific scenario today, but we do consider this one of the most important tasks facing us in foreign policy. China is vast and important, and we seek steadily improving relations with Peking."

This booklet, Domestic Developments in China and the Future of U.S.-China Relations, contains the proceedings of the "Wisconsin Conference on China" and is the seventeenth publication in the "Global Focus Series" published by the Institute of World Affairs. All presentations included were edited and supervised for publication by

Gary J. Topp, Program Coordinator of the Institute of World Affairs; they were typed for photographic reproduction by Christine Meyer of the Institute staff.

Dr. Carol Edler Baumann
Director
Institute of World Affairs

Dr. Carol Edler Baumann, Director of the Institute of World Affairs, addressing the opening session of the Wisconsin Conference on China, Friday evening.

(Photo by Alan Magayne-Roshak)

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PROGRAM

Saturday, May 14, 1977

Presiding: PHILLIPS TALBOT

8:45 A.M.

PANEL I: DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

Chairman: ALLEN S. WHITING

"Political Trends and Leadership Changes"

KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Swarthmore College

"Domestic and Foreign Economic Policy Issues"

NICHOLAS R. LARDY
Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
Yale University

"Rural Life and Social Change"

WILLIAM L. PARISH
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
University of Chicago

10:30 A.M. Break

10:45 A.M.

PANEL II: THE FUTURE OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

Chairman: PHILLIPS TALBOT

"Some Historical Perspectives"

PHILLIPS TALBOT
President
The Asia Society, Inc.

"Normalization: What Do We Win? What Do We Lose?"

EDWARD FRIEDMAN
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
The University of Wisconsin--Madison

"Normalization: Multilateral Implications"

JAMES P. GRANT
President
Overseas Development Council

"Taiwan: Future Options"

ALLEN S. WHITING
Associate
Center for Chinese Studies
The University of Michigan

12:30 P.M. Break

OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS: A CHARGE TO THE PANELS

ROBERT G. CHOLLAR
President
Charles F. Kettering Foundation

INTRODUCTION

In October 1975, a world affairs delegation visited the People's Republic of China (PRC) as one of the officially agreed-upon exchanges of groups jointly negotiated by China and the United States. It included China scholars, representatives of world affairs organizations, and members of the scientific and medical communities.

One of the major purposes of the visit was to experience China firsthand so as to acquire a better sense of the political system and of the societal development fundamental to the "China Model" in order to assess their relevance elsewhere. I would like to discuss the

---

Text of an address which accompanied a slide presentation on a recent visit to China.

nature of this change process which has so dramatically affected one-fourth of the world's population in the last twenty-eight years.

In so doing, we may generate some questions to temper your exposure to the views of the panels tomorrow. I would prefer, however, to leave the discussion of the ramifications and implications of foreign policy, as well as those who influence or are influenced by it, to the review to be made tomorrow. I will touch upon it only as it directly affects the development or disintegration of the "China Model."

CHINA MODEL

China today consists of 950 million people--one-fourth of the world's population. In territory, it is one-third larger than the United States. Since the Communist takeover in 1949--"the liberation"--the population has almost doubled; 50 percent of these are now under twenty years of age. Population control, however, may be the most vigorous and effective of any developing nation. Population growth in China is now below 2 percent per year.

Agriculture is the foundation of the national economy and the source of capital for developmental purposes in light and heavy industry. Eighty-five percent of the people on 13.5 percent of the land of China are involved in this activity. Agricultural production has been growing at a rate of 2 to 3 percent per year, a small step ahead of

the population growth at 2 percent. Industry, however, has grown at an impressive rate of 10 percent per year.

Collective enterprises serve local needs. As a result, "self-reliance" comes at you from all directions. The annual planning dialogue takes place at all levels from the lowest to the highest. The involvement of workers in management is mandatory. All of this gives them a psychic sense of participation in which alientation and anxiety seem to be absent.

In 1974, there were 50,000 communes with 740 million people living on them. The commune is a three-tiered operation in which the team is the basic unit of the economy. Leadership and control are exercised through revolutionary committees at all levels (cadre, technician, masses). The Communist Party consists of 28 million people, exercises lateral influence on the revolutionary committees, and attempts to resolve "contradictions."

In this history of the world, never has the orchestration of ideas, images, and mass behavior been more forcibly arranged, inspired, and controlled. Under the rhetoric of "proletarian consciousness," people were driven to formidable tasks of transforming themselves and their country. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

The problems of control were compounded by the success of the Communist program over the first two decades of its being. Improved food production, health care, and distribution all doubled the population from 400 to 800 million, the majority of whom were under thirty years of age.

The needs of this new, young, restless, idealistic, cynical constituency had to be addressed, and the unification of their energies required control of their minds and cultural interests. Thus, the "Cultural Revolution," instigated by Mao and ably abetted by his wife Chiang Ch'ing, in which the "superstructure" of education, literature, and arts were subjected and transformed completely to support the political, economic, and social changes deemed necessary.

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

For two decades, the PRC has experienced a phenomenal 10 percent per year industrial growth. Much of this depended on large-scale infusions of foreign technology, originally from the Soviet Union, Japan, and Europe, and now also from the United States. The development of large-scale industry will be the key to the speed of industrial growth. The Chinese now recognize the need to move from <u>extensive</u> development (increasing the output by building new plants) to <u>intensive</u> development (increasing output by improving the capital/output ratio). This

requires increasing technical sophistication by selective importation in the advanced technology and machinery of the steel, coal, petroleum, hydroelectric power, machine-building, and fertilizer industries.

Although the growth of labor-intensive, small-scale industries throughout the country since 1957 represents one of the most remarkable aspects of Chinese economic development, the self-reliant characteristic of this achievement will now be shadowed by the specter of productive inefficiency.

Whether China will become a modern industrial power by the year 2000, the goal stated by Chou En-lai, will depend on how it recruits and trains modern professional managers, how it obtains and affords advanced technologies, and how it integrates the economies-of-scale that such productive efficiency will offer, without jeopardizing the egalitarian, decentralized, self-reliant structure of the present "China Model."

AGRICULTURE

Up to now, agricultural production has slightly more than kept pace with population increase. This has been due to the introduction of high-yield strains of rice, increased use of fertilizers, extended irrigation, and flood control. Rice is double-cropped (China is the largest rice producer in the world) and wheat is single-cropped. It remains difficult to forecast the future, however, for the increase in agricultural

output per unit of input is slowing down. This may indicate a diminishing return on each added increment of fertilizer per unit of land.

On the communes, the cost of the products used for production accounts for 40 percent of total income, 6 percent is kept in a public accumulation fund for production expansion, 1 percent goes to welfare, and 50 percent is divided among the members of the commune. For purposes of that division, the workers are classified by themselves once a quarter on the amount of work they perform, the quality of their work, and their attitudes. Most of the foodstuffs and grain raised are produced within the confines of the team. No other institution affects the lives of China's rural population so much, nor contributes more to the self-reliant character of the country, than the commune team.

Despite its current importance, however, one must question the future of the commune, the source of full employment. Are the collective political and individual psychic gains which seem to be fundamental to the commune principle now beginning to be offset by inefficiency and low labor productivity?

The answer seems to be "yes," and there are indications that collectivism is quietly being pushed to a higher level--the brigade. In the 1950's, such a structure had disastrous results, and the smaller production team had to assume the role of "basic unit." What are the

new reasons for pushing upwards? One is resistance to better, more productive methods and the new centralized technology because of traditional peasant mentality at the team level. A new way must be found to assure the income of the peasants at the brigade level. Tactics will involve land reformation--increasing plot sizes, scientific farming, and capital construction, as well as transferring ownership from the team, which will be resisted.

SMALL-SCALE COTTAGE INDUSTRY

Fundamental to the Chinese rural economy up to now have been the small plants throughout the communes and the countryside. Their benefits have been several: the utilization of local labor, the savings on capital, the use of local resources to meet local needs, the reduction of the strain on central planning and national transportation systems, and the spreading of skills throughout rural areas. In addition, the agriculturally based cottage industries have added to the self-reliant nature of the countryside. They also establish one element of military security.

However, the problems of these cottage industries are also numerous: relative cost and efficiency and no economies-of-scale. For purposes of productive efficiency, there is no substitute for large scale. In China, the future for both types of industry--heavy and centralized, light and dispersed--is based on both financial and social

questions which are at the heart of the character of the "China Model."

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

There is no question that in China science has been propelled more by social factors than by innovation. The policy is one designed to "integrate research with practice through the masses." There is equally no question that some dampening of basic research was imposed by using academics to introduce farmers to progressive practices, and that some publication was also reduced during the Cultural Revolution years because of this.

But, I diverge from popular academic opinion that basic research has been eliminated. China's need to create a science and technology system which will contribute to its stated goals of economic growth and national independence, but not to violate the goals of mass participation and social equality, is difficult to satisfy by the science and technology modes of the West. But I personally cannot fault the goals. Indeed, by action or design, competing models for organization and administration of science have contributed significantly, in a way no single model could, to meet systems requirements for the establishment of an indigenous science in the service of production.

Nonetheless, the question for both educational and scientific institutions arises: as the older generation of Western-trained

scientists passes from the scene, is there a danger that the level of the sophistication of science and technology may fall further?

I think not, and for these reasons:

1. The merging of theory and practice is a distinct advantage.

2. There is a clear enthusiasm of all concerned for China's need for science and technology and for securing results.

SUMMARY

We saw a society based on a doctrine of the complete penetration of political indoctrination.

We saw a society in which industry supports agriculture for the well-being of the masses, where the educated bureaucrat participates in manual work, and where the masses participate in management.

We saw a system in which the individual is subservient to the concept of collective thinking and has a minimum of opportunity for "individual freedom" as we know it. Most Chinese, however, believe that "individual freedom" is guaranteed regular eating and a sense of participation, and they never had these before.

We saw a system where coercion seems to be one of persuasion, creating, if anything, only "benign fear," not the "overt fear" one sees on the streets of the Soviet Union.

If I'm asked if the "China Model" system works, I would say, "yes." In a poor country, now egalitarian, now with its basic needs met, it not only has worked but may be the most successful social and economic revolutionary experiment in history.

However, in Mao's concept of "continuing revolution," each stage has its own form of struggle. The "China Model" has been sufficiently resilient to resolve contradictions to date. However, the future makes the new struggle a challenge in contradictions that indeed will test the present PRC ethic, namely, that in the struggle between social change and economic development, social change must lead the way.

So what are the present conditions in the arena as it is prepared for the new stage of struggle?

1. Basic needs are met. They are spartan, but egalitarian.
2. Fifty percent of the population now are youth who have not experienced the problems of their parents. This new character of Chinese society may require other emotional releases than political ones.
3. The desire for increased productivity will demand more sophisticated technology, management, and centralization in industry.
4. The productivity of the team, which has been the agricultural unit of the economy and the wellspring of total employment, is now in question, due to a diminishing return per increased unit of input. A more

sophisticated level of management involving foreign technology, mechanization, and collective centralization at a higher level in the commune, the brigade, will apparently be necessary.

5. A tremendous competition exists for the limited available capital among the military, industry, agriculture, and the people's desire for consumer goods.

6. The question of the correct organization for higher education and science to meet the more sophisticated demands of the future needs to be resolved.

7. Consumer products of the PRC do not meet international standards, a must if the PRC wishes to extend its international trade to items other than agricultural products and raw materials.

8. To become a major economic and political force of the stature of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., a more interdependent and active Chinese foreign policy will be necessary.

I hope that tomorrow's panels will shed light on the questions embodied in these conditions for the new revolutionary phase which I have just enumerated.

In realizing the new goal of comprehensive modernization, everything filters down to the question at the "bottom line": whether or not the new process of change begins to compromise the benefits of the

present product of Mao Tse-tung's quest for moral community.

If the benefits of the old can be retained as part of the woven fiber of the new, a truly heroic model may be characterized--worthy, and perhaps possible, of emulation by other developing countries of the world.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ROBERT G. CHOLLAR is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Dayton, Ohio. Prior to assuming these duties in 1971, he was Vice-president and Group Executive for Research and Development and Manufacturing and on the Board of Directors of the National Cash Register Company, a career he began with that company as a research chemist in 1933. Mr. Chollar was educated at Dartmouth College and Antioch College. He holds an honorary Doctor of Science degree from the Indiana Institute of Technology. During his career, Mr. Chollar was responsible for numerous patents in chemistry, printing, synthetic rubber, and associated fields. He has published widely in these areas, as well as in electronics, memory systems, corporate standardization of business machines, and in water conservation. He has served on numerous boards and committees, including many associated with the United States Government. Presently, he is a member of the Board of the Dayton Power and Light Company, The Sloan-Kettering Institute of Cancer Research, The Dayton-Miami Valley Consortium, the Greater Washington Education Telecommunications Association, and a member of the Council for National Public Affairs Center for Television. Mr. Chollar has also been awarded Ohio's highest honor of Ohio Commodore.

PANEL I: DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

POLITICAL TRENDS AND LEADERSHIP CHANGES

KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
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THE SUCCESSION CRISIS

Age has taken an extraordinary toll among China's highest leadership over the past eighteen months. Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng, and Li Fu-ch'un succumbed within a period of twelve months. To imagine an equivalent in a U.S. context, one would have to conceive of a United States that had for a quarter century enjoyed the simultaneous services of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Henry Kissinger, J. Edgar Hoover, and J. P. Morgan, and then lost them all in one season. The succession now taking place in China is therefore far reaching. It transcends the task of finding someone to assume Mao Tse-tung's position and involves the passing of the mantle of the revolution to the next generation.

The succession crisis in China actually began in earnest over a decade ago, when Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural Revolution in order to unseat the then-designated heir apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i. Mao had to call on a coalition of leftist forces put together by his wife Chiang Ch'ing and army forces under Defense Minister Lin Piao in order to overcome the opposition he perceived in the Party leadership. Chou En-lai brought the government apparatus in on Mao's side at a key point in 1966. Since that time, each of these three partners--the leftists, the army, and Premier Chou and his followers--have tried to manage and control the succession. Each perceived the stakes to be high--indeed, to be the very survival of the values and integrity of the Chinese revolution itself.

Not surprisingly, then, the infighting from 1966 until the death of Mao on September 9, 1976, was intense and this decade of disarray has left profound legacies that now dominate the agenda of the Hua Kuo-feng administration. The purges and counterpurges that characterized this period indeed undermined the very rules of procedure that until 1966 had enabled the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to transform China while retaining its basic unity, authority, and legitimacy. By the time that the leaders gathered together to pay their respects to Mao's remains, the Party no longer had accepted means of making and implementing such major decisions as the appointments that would have to be made during the following weeks. Tellingly, the first major issue was thus settled, at least temporarily, by the summary arrest of the "Gang of Four" (Chiang

Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen) on October 6, thereby eliminating the highest-ranking radicals that had survived the final twists of the Cultural Revolution.

The past decade witnessed a process by which policy issues had become inextricably intertwined with personal political fortunes, both in Peking and throughout the governing apparatus at all levels in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Each faction sought to recruit new partisans into the ranks of the CCP and to promote these stalwarts into position of importance in preparation for the final showdown in the wake of the Chairman's death. Rules of recruitment, promotion, appointment, and even discipline and purge were therefore violated on a large scale. As the Party center in Peking fractionated, each faction at lower levels could seek protection and support from its mentors in the Forbidden City.

The various groups within the Party contending for power, moreover, argued amongst themselves over what it was the Chinese people really desired. As a part of this process, each went "to the masses" to foment the "public opinion" that would support the arguments they were making within the highest councils of the realm. The radicals launched political campaigns that stressed criticism of people in authority and of the rules and regulations the cadres used to channel the energies of the populace. The moderates, by contrast, encouraged suppression of these

radical-inspired activities. Many Chinese, of course, took advantage of this situation to give force to their own real desires, which frequently centered on issues of wages, employment, and welfare. This concatenation of forces produced serious dislocations in many places, such as along China's major railway lines, and led to substantial shortfalls in industrial production.

The above combined to produce a deflation of the authority of the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung had mobilized China's millions during the Cultural Revolution to ferret out capitalist roaders in the CCP and the radicals kept alive the specter of a "bourgeoisie right in the Party." The contradictory policies emanating from the central authorities, their seeming inability to bring about order in the streets and discipline in the economy, the continuing purges and counterpurges, all drained the faith of the populace in the wisdom and strength of a political organization that claimed the right to guide the largest country on earth through a continuing revolution.

THE PRESENT AGENDA

The above problems did not disappear with either the death of Mao or the purge of the "Gang of Four." They now structure the major concerns of the Hua Kuo-feng administration in China today. Hua's immediate political agenda may thus be summarized as follows:

The need to reestablish authority: There is a twofold problem to the question of authority. First, within the Communist Party, there is a need to reestablish the authority of the central leadership. The Chinese media now ring with the call for members and organs of the Party to "obey the Party Central Committee headed by the wise leader Chairman Hua." Secondly, the authority of the Party among the general populace must also be reaffirmed. Efforts to accomplish this to date have entailed a combination of rhetoric to establish the legitimacy of Hua Kuo-feng as Mao Tse-tung's handpicked successor and appeals to the desire for a period of "stability and unity" during which China can achieve the rapid economic growth that is necessary in order to raise standards of living and provide for an adequate national defense.

The "reinstitutionalization" of the CCP: Put simply, the Chinese leaders now keenly perceive the need to reestablish rules and norms within the Communist Party itself so that the Party can again function as a strong institution, not easily subject to disruption by factionalism and personal whim. This perception has found embodiment to date in repeated calls to hark back to the rules of procedure that characterized inner-Party life before the Cultural Revolution. The emasculation of these rules and norms had caused a sense of malaise among many Party members, and Hua Kuo-feng is acting forcefully to remove this source of

dissatisfaction and tension.

Eradication of the influence of the "Gang of Four": The radicals played a major role in Party affairs for more than a decade and, as noted above, they used their power to recruit followers and place them in positions of power throughout the Party apparatus. Thus, for instance, perhaps as many as 30 to 40 percent of the current Central Committee consists of followers of the purged "Gang of Four." Hua Kuo-feng clearly must confront this problem and establish his own authority, but the pervasive presence of Party members tainted by a radical affiliation poses a problem of major dimensions for him.

Hua wants to establish an image of unity, order, and equity. How can he do this while purging perhaps as many as one-third of the members of the Party? Likewise, how can plans for rapid rehabilitation of the economy forge ahead when the leadership at all levels is consumed by the problem of ferreting out hidden radicals? Indeed, will not a forceful purge simply arouse last-ditch opposition among the radicals throughout the Party?

Hua's response seems to be to minimize the purge, with an emphasis on allowing people to recant their past errors and find a nitch in the new order. Hua faces opposition on this issue, however, from several of his coalition partners, most notably the military

leadership and possibly from an about-to-be-rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-p'ing standing in the wings. This issue, therefore, is likely to remain nettlesome for some time to come.

Revitalization of the economy: Hua wants to respond to the popular desire for an increasing standard of living through rapid revitalization of the economy. This forms a key component of his basic program to make China into a modern, strong, socialist country by the end of this century through the rapid development of industry, agriculture, the military, and science and technology. This economic effort is, not surprisingly, multi-faceted, including inter alia: renewed stress on discipline in the enterprises and on cost accounting, production competitions, and related measures; liberalization of policy toward scientists and specialists in general; emphasis on the authority of teachers and of managers; greater attention to the role of foreign trade and the import of foreign technology; and so forth.

THE CONTINUING SUCCESSION

The fact that almost all of the above problems will take considerable time and energy to resolve means that politics in China are likely to remain fluid for several years. Put differently, the succession to Chairman Mao and the generation of old revolutionaries has just begun and will likely take two to five years to work itself out. What are the

political problems that are likely to bedevil China's leadership as it tries to come to grips with the above agenda of issues?

First, the fundamental cleavage between radicals and moderates over the past few years tended to polarize the political spectrum in China and produced some strange bedfellows. Now that the immediate threat of a radical-led succession to the leadership has been removed, the conflicts within the moderate/military coalition that have been submerged to date can come to the fore. These include such items as the above-mentioned disagreement on how best to eliminate the influence of the radicals; the position that Teng Hsiao-p'ing should have in the new administration, if any at all; and the percentage of the budget that should be devoted to modernizing the military.

More fundamentally, the radicals represent real social forces in China, forces that are likely to grow as the policies of the Hua administration are implemented with vigor. These policies focus on the need to industrialize China at the most rapid possible speed. This process, in turn, requires order and stability and yet it wrenches people out of their former life circumstances and thrusts them into a rapidly changing environment, a profoundly destabilizing, even revolutionizing, experience. Thus, anomie and alienation will almost certainly grow and will provide a fertile field for political contenders who might benefit from

sowing the seeds of discontent. The Chinese frequently say that every current produces its own countercurrent and this is likely to prove the case with the program of rapid modernization now being developed. Given a continuing succession, the chances of contenders trying to ride these countercurrents to power are good.

In sum, over the near term, China has many problems remaining and the "succession crisis" has not ended. We should not be surprised to see signs of instability in the future and perhaps some sudden and dramatic leadership changes over the coming two to five years. The effects of ten years of internal political war were not erased with the arrest of four people on October 6, 1976, and the basic problems of economic growth, national security, political unity, and social change that confronted China in 1976 will remain central through the years to come.

THE LONGER TERM

There are underlying trends that, while less visible, are shaping the way the Chinese polity is likely to look to the analyst a decade or more hence, and these are worth noting in order to put the above analysis of the current succession period into sharper perspective. These trends in their totality are pushing China toward a stronger, more centralized, somewhat more authoritarian, and more urban-oriented polity.

Part of the impetus for this direction of development comes from the growing problems of alienation and anomie noted above. The types of disorder that are likely to ensue will produce pressures in China, as they have elsewhere, for a stronger regimen in order to provide security for the vast majority of the population and ensure a continuing ability to meet the economic goals of the leaders. In short, the forces of order are stronger than are those of anarchy, especially with the specter of the Cultural Revolution remaining to haunt the leadership in power. The result will be a strong impetus to tighten discipline, an approach that undoubtedly will find favor with the army.

On the technological side, the communications and transportation revolutions have been in many ways the most profound transformations in the modern world over the past two decades, and they are working their influence on the Chinese polity now. These revolutions make it possible to collect, transmit, and analyze data in volumes and at speeds previously thought impossible, and thus they facilitate a more centralized system of economic planning in the PRC. Improvements in transport, relatedly, will decrease the cost to China of fostering regional specialization and developing a more nationally integrated economy. Indeed, the increasingly complex economy will itself generate pressures for more centralized decision making, at least up to the probable levels

of China's economic development over the next one to two decades.

China's greater use of foreign trade will also strengthen the hands of the central authorities, for it will provide them with control over one more key resource that will be highly desired by the subordinates in the provinces and enterprises.

And lastly, improvements in transport and communications are likely to strengthen the People's Liberation Army and in a real sense provide the central leadership with a greater ability to contain disruption and enforce its decisions. Modernization of the army may also increase the relative power within the military of strategic forces that are not closely tied to particular local bases.

China, in brief, may now, after perhaps some further twists and turns in the succession, firmly embark on the road of rapid industrialization. History tells us that this is likely to produce revolutionary changes in the lives of China's people, fundamental transformations in the way people view each other, their relationship to nature, and their roles as producers and as citizens. The pressures and resources generated by this process, however, will probably mold the polity into one that will conform somewhat more closely to our conventional views about how a government husbands and uses its authority than has been the case in the past.

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DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES

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INTRODUCTION

The crucial economic trends and issues in China today can be adequately assessed only from the perspective of the salient characteristics of China's development process over the past two and one-half decades. Furthermore, I believe that this assessment is enhanced by comparing China's development experience with that of other Third World countries that have engaged in the arduous task of development since World War II. Thus, I would like to begin by discussing what I regard as perhaps the three or four most important characteristics of China's development experience. These characteristics include China's relatively high rate of economic growth, its relatively minimal reliance on foreign financial assistance, and, perhaps most importantly, the marked concern

that the Chinese development process has shown for the economic welfare of what were initially the poorest members of China's society. A brief review of these characteristics will provide a perspective from which to evaluate the problems and dilemmas faced by the new Chinese leaders as they formulate China's Fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980).

ECONOMIC GROWTH

While it has become fashionable for economists and social critics in the West to declare that growth is obsolete, there can be little doubt that in the Third World the rate of growth of gross national product is regarded as the single most important measure of general economic progress and, in particular, as the best measure of a society's ability to improve the standard of living of its members. While experts will still quibble over some of the details, it is now generally agreed that by any standard Chinese economic performance since the Communist takeover in 1949 has been quite remarkable. Beginning from a position of weakness which was the result of several decades of war and civil war, the Chinese economy since 1952 has grown at an average annual rate of 6 to 7 percent. Although some other developing countries have grown as fast, few have sustained this rate for the entire post-World War II period. China's economic performance looks even more impressive when it is compared with the record of growth prior to the time the Communists

came to power or when it is compared with other large, densely populated Asian countries. While there were isolated pockets of economic growth and modernization in China prior to 1949, these were restricted to small, foreign-dominated coastal enclaves such as Shanghai, and the Northeast (Manchuria) which was developed under Japanese occupation and control. But the economy as a whole failed to exhibit any sustained growth of per capita income prior to 1949. In addition, it is worth noting that, among large, densely populated countries with income levels that were comparable to those of China in 1949, almost none have grown as rapidly as China. Chinese performance looks particularly favorable when it is compared with India, another large, continental-size country faced with the difficult problem of raising agricultural output on a relatively fixed quantity of arable land. The record shows that the rates of per capita growth in China have been roughly two to three times as high as those achieved in India. In short, the record of performance of the Chinese economy is quite good, both by the standard of China's pre-1949 experience and when compared with other developing countries since World War II.

FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Even more remarkable than China's comparative growth performance is its modest dependence on foreign financial assistance. Indeed, it has been said that China has depended less on foreign

financial aid, either in the form of outright assistance or concessionary loans, than any other successful developing country since the end of World War II. Even during the 1950's, when China was politically and economically allied with what was then known as the Soviet Bloc, the economic assistance received from the Soviet Union was relatively modest. Total Soviet loans, extended over roughly a decade, were only slightly more than $1 billion. Repayments began relatively quickly and by 1955 net credits from the Soviet Union had ended. During the decade 1955 to 1965, the Soviet loans were repaid out of China's trade surpluses. Indeed, except for very recent years, China has run balance-of-trade surpluses in almost every year since 1955.

At the same time the Chinese were repaying their debt to the Soviet Union, they began their own foreign economic assistance program. Since 1955, they have granted over $7 billion of economic aid to other less-developed countries, a very substantial net capital outflow for a country of China's relatively low level of economic development. Usually Chinese aid is for projects for the development of primary materials, agriculture, or infrastructure such as railroads. In recent years, Chinese foreign aid expenditures have run about $400 million per year. This is a relatively small amount, but, expressed as a percentage of China's gross national product, China's economic aid flows are almost

as generous as those of the United States, each country giving about .2 percent per annum of its national output in the form of economic assistance. China is the only less-developed country that has not only relied minimally on foreign credits, but also has been able to sustain a rather successful foreign assistance program of its own.

Again, the comparison with India is constructive. India, since independence in 1945, has run an almost continuous foreign trade deficit. This deficit has been financed by foreign aid and capital inflows primarily from the West, but in more recent years from the Soviet Union as well. Cumulatively, India received over the two decades from 1950 to 1970 over $13 billion in foreign aid and concessionary loans. India, in fact, has been the largest recipient of developmental aid in the world. Despite this generous assistance, which financed roughly 20 percent of all of India's capital investment during these two decades, India's rate of growth of gross national product in per capita terms has been about one-third of that of the Chinese.

SHARING BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

In the long run, China's relatively high rate of economic growth and its minimal reliance on foreign economic and financial assistance is less important than the efforts that the Chinese have made to assure a relatively widespread sharing of the benefits of economic growth.

Here China's record is probably more distinctive than its aggregate growth record or its minimal dependence on foreign economic assistance. In 1960, at the outset of the United Nations First Development Decade, a rate of growth of 5 percent was adopted as the major goal of economic development in the Third World. The United Nations and other multilateral lending agencies agreed to distribute aid to less-developed countries with this objective in mind. The explicit presumption that underlay this effort was that growth would benefit all members of society in less-developed countries. At the end of the decade, however, in many countries where the growth targets had been successfully reached, there appeared to be a larger number of people living in poverty and higher rates of unemployment than had been the case at the beginning of the decade. In short, the theory that the benefits of economic growth would trickle down to even the lowest levels of society seems to have been disproven. As a result, the World Bank, under the vigorous leadership of Robert McNamara, has begun to reorient its assistance programs to assure that they benefit all members of society and particularly those that were left behind during the 1960's. In practice, this has meant a new emphasis on rural development assistance. Indeed, the lending policies of the World Bank are being systematically redirected to achieve the goal of increasing production on small farms at the rate of 5 percent per year by 1985. To meet these

goals, the Bank is urging accelerated land-reform programs and policies to provide the rural poor with improved access to credit, extension services, as well as basic public services.

In short, the World Bank is now advocating a development strategy that in many ways parallels that which has been followed by the Chinese since 1949. The Chinese long ago adopted the view that economic development was not likely to succeed in the long run unless it improved the level of living of all members of society simultaneously. To achieve this goal, the Chinese in the very early years undertook systematic redistribution of landholdings that sharply reduced the incomes of wealthy landowners. Since that time, rural institutions, particularly the commune system, have evolved in a way that tends to make the distribution of income more equal than that which would be obtained under a market-oriented system. In urban areas, the Chinese government confiscated privately owned industrial and commercial companies. Rather than lining the pockets of a few, the profits of these companies have been systematically reinvested by the government. Wage policy has been marked by two distinctive characteristics. First, the wages of workers have risen relatively slowly. The average real wage in manufacturing is only about 30 to 40 percent higher today than it was twenty-five years ago. Secondly, the differential between the wages of managers,

engineers, and technicians, on the one hand, and those of ordinary workers, on the other, is relatively small for a country of China's level of economic development. As a result of these policies, China's wage bill has risen slowly and a relatively rapid rise in labor productivity has led to an increased level of capital investment. The share of output which is saved and invested has risen from less than 10 percent in 1952 to almost 30 percent in the mid-1970's, a rate that is matched by few countries at China's level of income. While the rate of increase in manufacturing wages is held at far below the rate of growth of labor productivity, real income in the agricultural sector has continued to grow, although modestly. Consequently, the all-too-common phenomenon of growing income disparities between workers in the modern high-wage sector and peasants in the rural sector has been largely alleviated.

INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE--ECONOMIC DILEMMAS

Despite this impressive long-term record, the post-Mao leadership is confronted with a series of fundamental economic dilemmas. The most important of these is the sharp decline in the rate of growth during the last three years. Performance in the industrial sector has been sharply curtailed as a result of political campaigns, particularly in 1974, and disruption surrounding the transition from the Chou-Mao era to the new leadership in 1976. Industrial growth in 1974, for example, was only

about 6 percent, half the long-term rate of growth between 1952 and 1973. After some recovery in the rate of growth in 1975, last year, 1976, appears to have been marked by the worst performance in a decade. The leftist followers of Mao's widow, Chiang Ch'ing, systematically undermined industrial production by charging that those responsible for economic management had been neglecting the revolution and class struggle. Pushing the slogan "once a good job is done in revolution, production will naturally go up," they appear to have successfully capitalized on long-felt grievances of industrial workers. The result was unprecedented labor strife, including strikes which previously were virtually unknown in China. In addition to sagging performance in industry, the regime has encountered considerable difficulties in agriculture in the last two years. For reasons that are far from fully understood, the rate of growth of agricultural output has fallen from about 3 percent to well under 2 percent. These difficulties have been compounded by recent severe droughts over much of China. As a result, the Chinese have already placed orders for the import of over 5 million metric tons of grain in 1977 or two times their total import during 1975. The highest-ranking Chinese economic official at a Central Committee meeting last month indicated that it would take three years to recover from the damage of the past few years. While perhaps an exaggeration designed to spur production efforts, the statement indicates the gravity

with which the leadership views recent events in industry and agriculture.

The relatively poor performance in both industry and agriculture over the past few years confronts the new leadership with a number of important questions. Indeed, I would hypothesize that their inability to formulate fully the Fifth Five-Year Plan, which was due to have gone into effect at the beginning of 1976, reflects their inability to resolve these questions. On the one hand, the new leadership appears to have committed itself to gradually raising the real wages of workers in the industrial sector. If not offset by substantial increases in worker productivity, this trend will inevitably lead to a decline in China's high rate of investment and subsequently in the overall rate of industrial growth. That is, in order to avoid inflation, the leadership will be forced to allocate a larger share of resources for the production of manufactured consumer goods, a shift away from its historic emphasis on machinery, equipment, and other heavy industrial goods. This would result not only in a rise in the share of consumption and a decline in the rate of investment, but would also constitute a significant setback to the policy of mitigating income differentials between the urban and rural sectors. While the causes of the recent downturn in performance in the agricultural sector are not fully understood, it is not inconceivable that the new leadership will also be forced to allocate a greater share of investment resources to agriculture.

While this may be necessary to maintain the rate of growth of agricultural output, the low payoff to investment in agriculture will inevitably further depress the overall rate of growth of the economy.

In summary, the recent poor performance in both industry and agriculture has highlighted the fundamental resource allocation problem faced by the new Chinese leadership. That is, first, to what extent should they increase wages in the modern sector in order to achieve higher rates of industrial growth, and second, to what extent should the allocation of investment resources be shifted even further in the direction of agriculture in order to solve the long-term problems of adequate food supply? This debate over fundamental issues of resource allocation takes place against the backdrop of heightened aspirations for growth. As most clearly articulated by the late Premier Chou En-lai in his official report to the government in 1975, the goal "is to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology so that China will be advancing in the front ranks of the world before the end of the century." Although it was widely anticipated that a concrete economic plan would be formulated outlining policies which would lead to the achievement of these ambitious objectives, last year foreign visitors were told by high-ranking economic officials that the Fifth Five-Year Plan was still in the course of being revised. The debate

over the revision of the Fifth Year-Plan does not appear to reflect different views about ultimate goals, but rather has to do with the perceptions of the nature of man and competing value systems. The most specific issue is whether workers can, over the long run, be motivated primarily by idealogical and intrinsic incentives or whether increased material incentives are necessary. The role of material incentives, however, is not an isolated ideological issue, but one which impinges on a whole host of interrelated questions. It lies at the nexus of issues involving the level and rate of investment, the rate of overall economic growth, and the degree of income inequality. Dispute over the nature of these tradeoffs and the priorities which should be utilized in making choices appears to be the fundamental reason for the delay in the formal initiation of the Fifth Plan.

FOREIGN TRADE

In addition to this dispute over wage and incentive policy, it appears that the degree of reliance on imported foreign technology is also central to the formulation of the Fifth Five-Year Plan. This debate can really be understood only in the context of the evolution of China's foreign trade policy. The formulation of China's Fourth Five-Year Plan, which covered the period 1971 to 1975, appears to have been based on a fundamental reassessment of the role of foreign trade and imported

Western technology in China's economic development. Whereas during the 1960's the leadership deliberately minimized imports (total trade turnover during the decade in constant prices was stagnant), China's foreign trade accelerated markedly during the Fourth Plan. From 1970 through 1974, the annual rate of growth of foreign trade in constant prices was over 11 percent. This is the only period since 1955, when net Soviet economic credits were terminated, during which the rate of growth of foreign trade has exceeded the rate of growth of industrial output. Most significantly, China's trade commitments included over $2 billion in complete plant and equipment contracts signed with Western countries during 1973 and 1974.

This sharp increase in the rate of growth of foreign trade, however, was accompanied by an unprecedented deterioration of China's trade balance. During 1974, the prices of industrial goods imported from the West rose sharply as a result of worldwide inflation. At the same time, Western demand for China's traditional exports, particularly cotton textiles, was shrinking. As a result, China sustained a trade deficit of about $800 million. In 1975 and 1976, the Chinese sharply curtailed the growth of imports while attempting to step up their exports. Consequently, the trade deficit was cut in half in 1975 and was further reduced last year. But the value of Chinese foreign trade in real terms actually fell

during the past two years. In short, Chinese economic planners found it difficult to integrate their planned economy with widely fluctuating world markets.

To minimize the adverse consequences of these developments in foreign trade, Chinese planners shifted the composition of imports. That is, despite the reduction in the total volume of imports, the value of imported machinery, equipment, and complete plants, all of which are vital to achieving the modernization goals which are implicit in Chou En-lai's report, continued to rise sharply in 1975. This high level of imports, approximately $2.2 billion, appears to have been approximately maintained in 1976. The continued growth of these crucial imports was achieved largely because a somewhat improved harvest in 1974 allowed Peking to curtail significantly the volume of food imports in the following year, 1975.

It appears, however, that in the absence of further policy changes, China will be unable to increase significantly this level of imported Western technology during the Fifth Plan. Food imports cannot be further reduced to accommodate growing imports of plant and equipment. In fact, the relatively poor performance of the agricultural sector in 1976 suggests that food imports will rise rather than fall. As a result, unless export growth can be rapidly accelerated, China will actually have to

reduce sharply the current level of imported machinery, equipment, and complete plants in order to finance increased food imports and to repay the medium- and short-term debts that have been incurred over the past three years. The prospects for export growth are not bright. Markets for traditional exports will probably remain weak. Although China's exports of machinery and equipment to less-developed countries have grown rapidly in recent years, they remain a relatively small portion of Chinese exports. Furthermore, exports of industrial goods to Third World countries would be subject to strong cyclical downswings during periods of slow growth or recession abroad. The prospects for China's most rapidly growing export, oil, are uncertain. The Japanese market is developing more slowly than was once anticipated both because Japanese companies appear to be unwilling to make the capital investments necessary to refine China's high-parafin-content oil and because the growth of China's own energy requirements is reducing the surplus of production over domestic needs.

CENTRAL DILEMMA--POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE

The central dilemma currently facing the leadership is whether to redefine further the policy of self-reliance. At the outset of the Fourth Plan, the policy was reformulated from one of minimizing the volume of trade to one of accelerating the rate of growth of foreign trade while minimizing reliance on foreign credits. The unexpected deficits

that resulted, however, were financed by increasing use of deferred payments for complete plant imports, solicitation of foreign currency deposits from correspondent banks of the Bank of China, sales of gold on European markets, and even short-term borrowing in the Eurodollar market, hardly a picture congruent with the policies of financial self-sufficiency. The determined effort to reduce the trade deficit in 1975 and 1976, as well as explicit statements by high-ranking Chinese officials to foreign visitors, suggest that a balanced trade account has remained a high-priority goal.

On the other hand, it would appear unlikely that the Chinese will be able to attain their ambitious Fifth Five-Year Plan goals for industrial, agricultural, defense, scientific, and technical modernization if imports are curtailed to generate trade surpluses sufficient to repay a large cumulative deficit incurred in the period between 1974 and 1976. Indeed, recent articles in the Chinese press suggest that there is an ongoing intense debate regarding foreign economic policy. The major issues appear to be whether or not to institutionalize the financial practices adopted unwillingly in the period 1974 to 1976 and whether or not to adopt a more vigorous export-promotion strategy. At a minimum, financial liberalization would include greater reliance on medium-term deferred payment arrangements to finance current account deficits. Long-term credits might also be sought for the first time since the 1950's. Finally, and

perhaps most controversially, the Chinese may seek to conclude a long-term oil export agreement with Japan. Conceivably, this could even include cooperative arrangements for the production of liquified natural gas and joint exploitation of China's offshore oil deposits. The choice would appear to be a further relaxation of the policy of self-reliance, or a stretch out of the modernization program. Since there appears to be widespread consensus on the goal of rapid economic modernization, the debate in Peking appears to be focusing on whether this further relaxation of the policy of self-reliance should take the form of financial liberalization, more deliberate export promotion, or perhaps even cooperative arrangements for the exploitation of China's natural resources.

SUMMARY

While Chinese economic performance during the first two and one-half decades of Communist rule has been quite strong, in the past two to three years the economy has been relatively weak. While it is not clear whether this is primarily due to political campaigns and disruptions or to more fundamental economic causes, the new leadership is confronted with a series of interrelated economic problems as they strive to move the economy into a high-growth track that would lead to the fulfillment of their very ambitious objectives. The most fundamental problem is the appropriate mix of incentives to use to achieve industrial

development. Can ideology continue to substitute to some extent for increased material incentives or must the Chinese move towards a wage policy which would allow more rapid increases in the average wage, as well as increased wage differential reflecting skill and other factors influencing productivity? A second crucial issue is the degree to which they will move further away from their policy of self-sufficiency in order to accelerate the transfer of modern equipment and technology from the West.

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RURAL LIFE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, we are still grappling with models which will help us come to grips with Chinese reality. Though abandoned in some circles, one model of China is that of the authoritarian state which can produce organizational and behavioral change on command. Even if the state consigns few people to labor camps, it has such a monopoly of jobs and economic resources that everyone must comply. Another model which tempts us is that of the ideologically mobilized state with mass consciousness transformed through study combined with group criticism and self-criticism. So transformed, behavior moves in directions desired by official ideals because people have already internalized these ideals in their own persons. We know that both of these models are too simplistic. They are too monolithic, assuming a uniformity of living conditions which is surely absent in China, just as it is absent in

our own country. This absence of uniformity, and the need to consider concrete living conditions, is no better illustrated than in comparisons between Chinese urban and rural life.

URBAN AND RURAL LIFE

In Chinese cities, we can reasonably expect that there will be considerable change in community, family, and ritual institutions, and that much of this change will be in directions favored by official ideals. In cities, bureaus and schools provide favorable settings for political study groups to successfully shape and control people's attitudes (Whyte 1974). Nurseries, kindergartens, and other means of socializing the young are common. With women having independent jobs, families must approach the ideal of husband-wife equality. Parental authority is greatly diminished and the introduction of cremation must alter ideas about ancestor worship. Nevertheless, not everyone in cities is exposed to the same life conditions. Some are in collective rather than state employment and do not share in the same generous programs of health care, nurseries, and pensions. Some women remain unemployed or only in very-low-paying jobs, and study groups are far from universally successful. Unfortunately, Western studies are only just beginning to give us some idea of the full range of these life conditions (see Banister 1976; White 1976; Vogel 1969), and it is to rural studies that we must turn if

we are to get an appreciation of the full texture of Chinese social life.

First, in rural community life, the Russian experience provides a useful point of contrast. Due to their large size, outside leadership, rigid central control, and a negative history of low state prices and forced collectivization, Russian collective farms have had great difficulty inspiring peasant enthusiasm and cooperation. Chinese collective units have been much more successful in this effort, not only by providing adequate prices and more flexible central direction, but also by utilizing and strengthening natural solidarities. The effective unit of production and income sharing (the production team) remains small and is organized around a preexisting small village or neighborhood of a larger village, which at the same time may be part of a single kinship group. Leaders are chosen from their native village, are kinsmen and long-time neighbors of the people they lead, receive little or no extra pay in their work, and can expect to spend the rest of their lives in the same village, often retiring from office in just a few years.

With the possible exception of brigade Party secretaries, there is then minimal differentiation between leader and led. This commonality of status and interests among villagers is further reinforced by strict migration laws keeping males in their home village and increasingly by intravillage marriage, keeping females near home as well. As in

Russia, while not eliminating all inequalities among families, collective payment systems have narrowed sharp income differentials which would separate one family from another while collectively held land has given all families in a production team a common set of economic interests. These commonalities, plus cumulative years of experience in hammering out payments systems, grain-distribution systems, work arrangements, etc., have given peasants a new sense of collective unity.

While providing excellent incentives for collective farming, this comparative unity of purpose need not support all government goals. Unity within small collective units can inhibit cooperation with larger collective units. Government attempts to enlarge collective units, first in 1958 to 1959 and then in a few places in 1968 to 1969, have been resisted by small production units which saw their interests threatened, and the stories of conflict among collective units struggling to protect their own land, water, and animals or trying to usurp that of others sound very much like conflicts between villages before 1949 (Parish 1976).

Similarly, though model villages have leaders who identify with national goals and drag villagers along in pursuit of these goals (Meisner 1975), most southern village leaders are so captured by their village as to be unable to force unpopular programs on their neighbors, friends, and kinsmen. When forced by the government to do so, many

will resign, thereby exposing a weak link in the system of authoritative control.

Ideological control is weakened by the inability of most villages to sustain political study groups in the face of more practical concerns of peasant life. As a result of the internal unity of villages, the inability of leaders to identify totally with the bureaucracy above, and the difficulty of ideological penetration, social changes tend to be decided in terms of the collective interests of villages and villagers rather than according to some unified administrative or cultural norm.

SOCIAL CHANGE--THE FAMILY

In family and ritual realms, this tendency towards selective adoption of new values and programs is further supported by the government's emphasis on persuasion in place of coercion and by the mixed incentives which present collective structures provide. Though deprived of land, families remain significant income, housing, child-care, and welfare units (Parish 1975). As a result, "young people have more say in picking marital partners now, although parents still exercise substantial influence . . . Women work in the fields to a much greater extent now than in the past, new brides are less subservient vis-à-vis their in-laws, and the authority of family elders has generally softened. Young couples marry at later ages than formerly (although not as late as

the government would like), have somewhat fewer children, and are more likely to form an independent household relatively soon after marriage, rather than maintaining an extended family. Divorce initiated by women has increased . . .

"Balanced against these kinds of changes are a number of areas of continuity. The family rather than the individual is still the primary unit of rural life . . . Newly married couples almost always live with the groom's family at first, rather than with the bride's parents or by themselves. Women still do the lion's share of domestic work in addition to their work in the fields, men dominate family decision-making, and women receive only token representation in the village power structure . . . The groom's family has to provide the bride's family with a very substantial bride price in order to seal the marriage agreement, and marriage finance today appears to represent the proscribed 'marriage by purchase' even more than in the past, because the value of the dowry the bride brings back with her has declined. In cases of divorce or death and remarriage the woman does not, in fact, achieve the equal rights to family property and child custody which official policy proclaims" (Whyte et al. 1977).

SOCIAL CHANGE--RITUALS

The pattern of mixed response to government appeals for

social change is repeated in ritual realms. There has been a general retreat from community, lineage, and professionally led rituals to rituals centered around family life. Temples and religious specialists became inactive in the 1950's. Lineage halls were deprived of their ancestral plaques and converted to other usages in successive campaigns, culminating in a complete elimination of lineage-hall activities in the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, though often simplified in form, family rituals connected with birth, marriage, and death continue very much in a traditional pattern. Many families continue to revere their ancestors as symbolized in domestic plaques, red strips of paper with the proper names written upon them, or simply by pictures placed in the main family hall. Weddings continue to be highly elaborate with many guests and multiple tables laden with food. New political rituals, such as on National Liberation Day or International Women's Day, continue to be pale images of the community rituals they were to replace, while annual festival celebrations in the home continue to be vigorously attended to. Collectivization, then, has narrowed rather than expanded the circle of ritual celebration.

Significantly for the study of interrelationships between values and social change, those changes in family and ritual which have occurred are related less to political and educational conditions than to

structural conditions, such as village prosperity, population, land, and the like. Villages with more Party members, political study groups, broadcast networks, and full school enrollments might be presumed to be more attuned to central values and programs of social change, but they are no more likely than other villages to have low bride prices, husband-wife equality, extensive birth control, simple rituals, or a host of other government-sponsored social conditions. Instead, response to government ideals is predicated on more specific village conditions. Prosperous villages give low bride prices because, given the marriage market, families anxious to get their daughters into affluent villages must accept a smaller price. Populous villages are likely to use more egalitarian time- as opposed to task-rate work point systems simply because it is too difficult to keep account of task rates with a large work force. Villages with little land are more likely to restrict their birth rate.

Response to government programs, then, is less in terms of broad cultural trends in the society than in terms of very local costs and benefits. Collectivization in the mid-1950's caused a major restructuring of these costs and benefits, and some rapid changes in family and ritual life followed. Since that time, changes in costs and benefits, and their associated social practices, have been much slower.

SUMMARY

In sum, as we should have realized all along, neither Chinese peasants nor the general population are automatons responding to simple commands or ideological appeals from above. The relationship between government appeal and popular response is much more dynamic, depending on the particular circumstances of each person's life. If we are to understand Chinese patterns of social change, we must understand the circumstances in which each sector of the population is involved. For peasants, the most salient circumstances are a highly solidary collective/village community combined with a continuing central role for individual families. For other sectors of the population, these sectors have yet to be carefully delineated, and until they are, we will have only a vague impression of the full texture of Chinese social life and social change.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Mr. Robert G. Chollar, President of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, delivering a slide presentation and a "Charge to the Panels" based on a world affairs delegation's visit to the People's Republic of China.

(Photos by Alan Magayne-Roshak)

(left to right) Dr. James Read, Charles F. Kettering Foundation, (back to camera), Dr. Werner A. Baum, Chancellor of The University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, Mr. Robert G. Chollar, Dr. Carol E. Baumann, and Ambassador Phillips Talbot, enjoy an after dinner conversation Friday evening.



Panel I — "Domestic Developments in China." (left to right) Dr. William L. Parish, Dr. Nicholas R. Lardy, and Dr. Kenneth G. Lieberthal, panel participants, listening to the panel's chairman, Dr. Allen S. Whiting, making his opening remarks on Saturday morning.

At breaktime, some members of the audience gather to discuss the substance of Panel I's discussion.

Ambassador Phillips Talbot (right) delivering his opening remarks beginning Panel II's discussion of "The Future of U. S.-China Relations." The panel members were: (left to right) Dr. Allen S. Whiting, Dr. James P. Grant, and Dr. Edward Friedman.

The Honorable Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, addressing the luncheon following the presentations by Panels I and II.

PANEL II: THE FUTURE OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

PHILLIPS TALBOT
President
The Asia Society, Inc.

INTRODUCTION

The future of United States-China relations is, of course, very much on the minds of Americans as a new administration makes fresh assessments of America's place in the world in the late 1970's and beyond. As a nation, we have gone through extraordinary experiences in Asia in the generation since World War II. Even Vietnam is now behind us, and we have emerged into what is clearly a different period. Our Pacific trade now surpasses American trade with the European Economic Community, and continues to grow at a faster rate. Economic, social, political, and environmental developments in the Pacific region impinge ever more directly on the welfare and livelihood of the American people. Looking to the future of American interests in East and Southeast Asia, President Carter and the State Department and Congress obviously cannot forget or turn away from the unresolved question of our relations with the fifth of

the human race who live in China. That is the agenda of the able and experienced people who are to take part in this panel discussion.

AMERICAN VIEWS OF CHINA THROUGH A PRISM

Before turning to the future, however, we can profit from reminding ourselves of some of the historical perspectives which color and condition current American views of China. Most of you have seen the new "Headline" book China and America: Past and Future by Michael Oksenberg and Robert Oxnam. I recommend its succinct and effective handling of these matters. Surveying the historical record, the authors conclude that Americans have too often looked at China through the prism of our own hopes and anxieties, rather than with dispassionate objectivity.

This is perhaps natural. A saying attributed to the ancient Chinese themselves tells us that "one returns from abroad having seen what he understands." Our understanding of China has been limited, and so have our perceptions. In each generation, we have tended to see what we understand and to miss the rest, however important that might be. What's more, hindsight has permitted one generation to understand some of the misperceptions of its forebears, but in each decade we have traditionally been less aware of whatever misappraisals might be current. (This is not exclusively an American trait, of course. History is replete

with examples of similar experiences in other civilizations.)

As a result of changing and often fragmentary perceptions, Americans have tended with respect to China to ride a roller coaster of rising and falling expectations. In some periods, we have looked to China mainly with affection and admiration; at other times, more with fear and antagonism. These shifts have been paralleled, I should immediately add, by similar swings in Chinese attitudes toward America. The reinforcing effects of these changes at both ends of the Sino-American connection have undoubtedly led to exaggeration of both the "ups" and the "downs." We cannot doubt that a more mature relationship could be built on a longer range and more realistic set of appraisals in both directions.

CHINA'S SELF-PERCEPTIONS

Some of the fundamental conditioning influences on China's self-perceptions are worth noticing here. In the first place, of course, China is one of the two higher world civilizations--India being the other one--that in its own homeland has maintained a continuing cultural identity from ancient times to the present. As compared to modern Egyptians and Greeks, for example, whose links with their classical pasts have been subjected to successive ruptures, the Chinese cultural continuity has clearly given the Chinese people fiber and a sense of their own importance in the world scheme.

It is true that, during the past century and one-half or so, China has experienced hammer blows of change from external and internal forces directed at the Confucian system which was for so long the central organizing principle of Chinese life, and whose influence few would argue has even yet been wholly eliminated, despite Maoist opposition. This period--the one when the West has been most closely in contact with China--has brought a succession of radical breaks: the Taiping uprising, the 1911 revolution, the 1949 civil war, and, in a different sense, the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's. In some of these generations, China has deserved the description offered by Sun Yat-sen, i.e., "a heap of sand." Yet, as a nation, it has been revivable and revived, if most recently through authoritarian rebuilding that in disciplinary terms would do credit to the strongest of the old emperors. It is no wonder that American perceptions have been kaleidoscopic and often emotional.

OLD STEREOTYPES AND A WIDENING APPRECIATION

Consider the facets of Chinese experience that have touched Americans. It has not been so long since a prevailing stereotype identified Chinese in America as those coolies brought to this country as hard-working and cheap labor to help build our Western railways or as the laundrymen who, by sixteen-hour days, could do our shirts so much more cheaply than anyone else. Hard-working Chinese are still in our midst,

some of them in restaurants but others in laboratories and corporate executive suites. Yet the old images die hard. I have been astonished to learn that the tales of Fu Manchu are being reissued. Our press still enjoys writing of Chinatown tong wars. This is one facet.

Another, I believe, is the widening appreciation among Americans of what is taught us of the wisdom of the East. If sometimes this comes in the form of a "Confucius say" cartoon block designed to provide a momentary chuckle, increasingly it speaks to us through the profundities of Confucian classics, and the mystery and beauty of Taoism at its best, Sinified Buddhism, and the exquisite art forms that have helped shape our aesthetic tastes. From this direction, we have sensed the vitality, the depth, the humor, and the patience of the Chinese.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY PERCEPTIONS

Then there have been the personal contacts across the Pacific. In the nineteenth century, we sent clipper ships and missionaries and traders and naval squadrons to the China coast. A mixture of morality and practical trading interests brought John Hay's Open Door policy at the turn of the century. In my own youth, many Americans watched with a sense of frustration and guilt the inaction of the United States and the world in the face of the Japanese takeover of Manchuria and North China.

Compensation for the 1930's feeling that we had not done anything to help the poor Chinese, that we were important in Asia, came in World War II. China became, to us, an important power, with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek as its heroes. Even then, some of us in China at the time became anxious at the prospect of American disillusionment when, as it seemed to us, the gleaming castles of the Chinese state's power and influence should turn out to have been built on sand.

Clearly, Americans did react strongly against the Communist victory in 1949 and even more strongly against the Chinese entry into the Korean war, which so drastically upset official American calculations there. After that, it was no surprise that for a generation American hopes were focused primarily on the government of the Republic of China located on the offshore island of Taiwan, which, after fifty years of Japanese rule, had been returned by the Allies to China immediately after World War II. The concomitant was, of course, a mutual quarantine between the mainlands of China and North America, and, for much of that period, many other countries as well.

What a contrast to these moods has swept across the United States in the 1970's. Following the Nixon visit to Peking, a sudden excitement was felt in this country over what was called the

reopening of China to Americans. Older, warmer attitudes toward China flowered alongside and often in place of the more recent negative images. By now, something like 100,000 Americans have applied for visas to visit the People's Republic of China, and more than 10,000 have in fact made trips there.

Such rapid and abrupt changes in perceptions of China as our generation has experienced can only create confusion and disorientation. This works both ways. We go to China now, receive warm welcomes, and discover the current use of textbooks in which the Chinese young have been taught to hate America. We look at American textbooks still adopted for our schools and find too frequent distortions in their treatments of China. After thirty years of mutual cold war rhetoric, we in both countries in this decade have had to adjust ourselves to the newspaper photos of a smiling Mao and a smiling Nixon, a smiling Chou En-lai and a smiling Kissinger, and even a smiling Teng Hsiao-p'ing and a smiling American world affairs delegation.

SUMMARY

In short, the roller coaster rolls on. Perhaps this is inevitable to a degree. Chinese and American attitudes have regularly reflected current political postures rather more than underlying cultural continuities. And yet, as Americans look to the future, whose shaping

must be high on the Carter administration agenda, we need a steadying down, or longer perspective, more maturity in assessing the various shades of gray in Chinese-American relationships rather than riding with the blacks and whites. A more careful exploration of opportunities and pitfalls to be found on roads to the future might help us to make wiser choices than sometimes we have done in the past.

And that is where our knowledgeable panelists will take up the thread.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PHILLIPS TALBOT, President of The Asia Society, Inc., since January 1970, has had careers in journalism, academic life, and diplomacy. After graduation from the University of Illinois in 1936, he became a local reporter for the Chicago Daily News before World War II and one of its correspondents in Asia after the war. The intervening years included study in England and India under the auspices of the Institute of Current World Affairs and wartime naval service in India and China. In 1954, Dr. Talbot received a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Chicago. Before his present appointment, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1961 to 1965, and United States Ambassador to Greece from 1965 to 1969. He also served for ten years as Executive Director of the American Universities Field Staff.

NORMALIZATION: WHAT DO WE WIN? WHAT DO WE LOSE?

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INTRODUCTION

Almost thirty years after the founding of the People's Republic of China, relations between China and the United States were not yet normalized. Governments in Washington continued to recognize as the government of all of China's hundreds of millions of people the heirs to the defeated side in China's revolutionary civil war in exile on the tiny island of Taiwan. The island of Taiwan, calling itself the Republic of China, continued to house the American Ambassador to China.

It is not unnatural to assume that any policy persisted in for such a lengthy period, a policy which ran counter to that of some of

Washington's closest European allies, must serve some vital American interests. Such an assumption, however, seems completely without basis.

Historians have established that the interests which really mattered to American presidents had little to do with China itself. Rather, at stake were a combination of political support at home in the U.S. and fear of alienating backing for supposedly more important policies in other parts of the world. Shockingly, despite the explosion of three recent Asian wars involving both America and China--Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and the Indochina Wars--, Washington's policies toward China have been a very low priority item.

The major thing to be won by a change, by a policy of genuine normalization with the government of China, is an opportunity to come to grips with this real dangerous world of Asia. Perhaps the cause of peace will gain in brushing aside the illusions and delusions which have heretofore guided U.S. policy in Asia. The cause of war and hostility has hitherto been the main beneficiary of abnormal U.S.-China relations.

Yet President Truman had put before him the basic facts: the new China did not want to become dependent on the Soviet Union, and the nationalistic group headed by Mao Tse-tung explicitly and continually

asked Washington for an alternative to that dependency, asked for recognition, aid, and trade. But Truman rebuffed those requests.

President Truman needed the support of America's so-called Asialationists. These conservatives, who doubted the wisdom of helping a supposedly decadent, virtually socialistic Western Europe stand up to Soviet Russian pressure, as Truman wished, preferred aiding allegedly virile Christian anti-Communist despots in divided Asian nations, such as China, Korea, and eventually Vietnam. Truman felt compelled to concede to their demands in Asia and thereby won their backing for his European policies now predicated on a worldwide crusade against communism.

China therefore became America's enemy and Chiang Kai-shek's remnant on Taiwan its ally. America was consequently more easily drawn into local struggles in Korea, over Quemoy and Matsu, and in Vietnam. When such expensive illusions began to prove too costly, the world was redefined. Not surprisingly, in the subsequent period--the Kissinger era of balance-of-power politics--, China reemerged in American strategic thinking, as it already was in reality back in 1949, as a potential check to Soviet ambitions. What we must try to understand is why it continues to seem so costly to American presidents to catch up with and take advantage of possibilities and realities more than a quarter

century old.

President Nixon deserves more credit for courage in changing U.S. policy toward China than he is usually given. In fact, some evidence suggests that Nixon's new China policy may have facilitated his removal from office. Deeply disappointed by Nixon's alleged betrayal of "free" allies for friendship with so-called atheistic, communistic tyrannies, the heirs of the Asialationists, conservative Republicans, not only put up a candidate against Nixon for the 1972 Republican nomination, but did not rally with full force to his side at impeachment time. Nixon tried to woo and win such people by keeping Kissinger from fulfilling the promise of the communiqué agreed to in 1972 at Shanghai in China, keeping from recognizing Peking and bringing an end to the fiction that the island of Taiwan was China. Kissinger's historically rooted fear that unsettled territorial disputes such as Taiwan regularly lead to large wars was superceded by Nixon's fear that normalization of relations with China would lose him the senatorial votes against impeachment that he needed to remain president.

U.S. DOMESTIC FORCES

What is to be lost by normalizing relations with China? From start to finish, this is a question which is answered silently or implicitly more by concerns over domestic political forces in the U.S. than

in terms of a concern over what policy is in the best interest of the United States in Asia, in the interest of peace and progress in Asia. Hence, we have no choice but to look at the continuing bases of these domestic forces.

It makes greater sense, to be sure, to act on President Carter's apparently preferred initiatives: to remove U.S. ground troops from Korea; to abandon the major useless military base in the Philippines; to recognize Peking for what it is, the government of all of China; to end the military agreement with Taiwan; and to remove remaining U.S. military forces from Taiwan. That is, it is not reasonable to assume unquestioningly that the disposition of U.S. forces at the end of World War II should define unthinkingly real American interests in a very different age.

But powerful American forces within and without continue to insist on just that. Thus, while President Carter may seem to get much of what he wants, he may also have to give these opposition forces much that they want. The result will be abnormal normalization. On the surface, it may appear that the U.S. government is truly dealing with the actual world of the last decades of the twentieth century. The old forces in fact will still be there to preclude genuine normalization.

It was not easy to persuade the U.S. military to pull out of the Bonin Islands and return them to Japan. These forces of what

some call "security imperialism" did not easily accede to the return of the Okinawa chain to Japan. They are delaying the completion of Carter's policies in Korea. These forces, political and paramilitary as well as military, argue for alleged intelligence and confidence-building benefits from their presence. They have friends in the relevant foreign governments, as well as the American press, bureaucracies, and Congress. They can create events, selectively leak news, and do their best to make Carter's initiatives look naive. When they claim that genuine normalization will injure U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and frighten Japan, their grammar of motives will seem so persuasive that few people will notice that precious little logic underlies the persuasive rhetoric. We must come to understand what can turn empty words into political weapons.

These interests speak to larger, deeper forces at home in the U.S. The Wilsonian commitment to national independence, especially for small and weak peoples, expresses itself more than in CIA dealings with the Tibetans, minority groups in Southeast Asia, and Taiwan's independence. It speaks to the moral basis of American foreign policy thinking. And it is reinforced by the concern of American people of East European descent to see their ancestral lands free from Soviet domination, Americans of Jewish descent to keep Israel independent, Americans of Cuban descent to oppose a Soviet-dependent Cuba. A president, that is,

can reasonably fear that truly accommodating China on normalization will, because of the political and moral implications of betraying an independent Taiwan, win him enemies at home, lose him the backing of people in powerful places and at the grassroots whose support he needs for issues he considers more important than normalization of relations with China. The same kinds of forces that worked against presidents from Truman on up through Nixon also work against Carter.

There is the problem that China claims to be Marxist socialist and Taiwan does not, in addition to the question of Wilsonian self-determination. This has a moral dimension and a commercial one as of old, when the same American ships took bibles and opium to China. There is a large sector of the American people who prefer a government, such as the one on Taiwan, which does not propagandize against religion as the People's Republic, on the other hand, does. There is an influential sector of American business which by 1977 had in book value about half a billion dollars invested in Taiwan--probably at least twice that in real value, with some estimates running to four times that amount--earning very high rates of profit. And U.S. trade with Taiwan was more than ten times that with mainland China in 1976. While there were tensions, illegalities, and problems with Taiwan's exports of mushrooms, textiles, televisions, and footwear to the U.S., and while wages were rising in

Taiwan and the government was moving to create and control its own industrial lifelines, nonetheless, in an era increasingly marked by the need to pay attention to foreign profit taking, these advantages to the American economy from profitable relations with Taiwan, many in business--and not only business--argued, should not simply be abandoned.

Consequently, American political circles began to persuade themselves that they could normalize relations with Peking and continue almost normal relations with Taipei, maintain warm political relations with Peking and friendly economic ones with Taipei. Washington seemed to have won the best of both worlds. Why change?

Surely rulers in Peking would see, it was contended, that even without a formal military agreement with Taipei, an American government would be forced by public, business, military, and congressional opinion to rally to Taipei's side should Peking try to take Taiwan by force. Hence, Peking would not attempt such an irrational action. Thus, one could predict a secure, long-term, stable situation in which Taiwanese and American business could mutually prosper. Conveniently, Peking would concede to Washington's preferences.

CHINA AND RUSSIA

Oddly, people expecting Peking to understand and respect the assumed imperatives of American politics did not look closely at

Chinese politics, or to be more exact, they comforted themselves by persuading themselves that they did not have to look closely at Chinese politics. Rather, all that it was necessary to know was that China so needed America against Russia that there was no way China would move to alienate America. Taiwan was secure as a result.

There is more to this argument. Anti-China sentiment is so much a given in Soviet politics that even the so-called dissident intellectuals in the U.S.S.R., who most oppose the Soviet tyranny, are usually even more opposed to the Chinese government. And for Russia's rulers, the need to be on guard against China helps justify their power and international policies. To concede to China, which helped Albania win its independence of the U.S.S.R., which condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which facilitates greater independence from the U.S.S.R. of other East European governments--most prominently Rumania--, would mean, in the Kremlin, to concede to a weakening of control over other "socialist" countries. Part of the high budget for the Soviet military is justified in anti-China terms. In short, there are many --the above are just some--powerful reasons and forces which turn Moscow against Peking and force Peking to look to Washington. Given such fundamentally defining factors, the argument for U.S. inaction went: How could a relatively militarily weak Peking move militarily against

Taiwan and leave itself exposed to Soviet attack? So again the idea is underlined that Washington can normalize relations with Peking and still, almost as of old, continue relations with Taipei. As long as China needs America to help check the Soviet Union, China's concern for the larger international situation reduces the disagreement over Taiwan to a minor irritant.

This idea, which seems to undergird legitimate, official, and established American thinking on normalization of relations with China, is far less sound than it at first seems. In fact, this idea that everything can continue as usual with Taiwan is a necessary illusion to protect Washington from difficult decisions now, an illusion whose ill effects may in the long run set in motion another most explosive chain reaction in Asia.

This fiction that China and Russia are permanent, most hostile enemies has about as much basis in fact as the idea in the 1950's that China and Russia were permanent, most close allies. Have people whose memories span an era which includes China as America's friend in World War II, as enemy in Korea, and again in the 1970's as friend everywhere from NATO and Bangladesh to Zaire and Angola forgotten that nations do not have permanent friends or enemies? Have they forgotten when it was inconceivable that France and Germany would be allies?

This fiction about permanent enemies leads us to forget that the issue really is, as it has been from the beginning, forces within the U.S. which seem to predetermine policy and therefore require the creation of ideas in harmony with these parochial interests, ideas such as the permanent friendship or antagonism of Peking and Moscow.

INTERNAL CHINESE POLITICS

Once we stop assuming that there cannot possibly be anything in Chinese politics to see, we might just look a bit closer to that political realm and find evidence calling into question those improbable assertions about permanent antagonisms. We must look seriously within Chinese politics as we expect China to look within American politics. There is evidence that in 1976 some very powerful people in China did begin to more than play with the idea of using force to liberate Taiwan. The group associated with Chiang Ch'ing and the so-called ultraleft informed high-level visitors that they had not excluded force as a means by which to resolve the Taiwan situation and finally end China's nationalistic, revolutionary civil war, almost completely reuniting the Chinese nation for the first time since nineteenth-century imperialism started carving China up, with Japan taking Taiwan. Military maneuvers by China were extended further into the Taiwan Strait than ever before. When Chiang Ch'ing was ousted from power, she was accused of seeking allies to join

against the rulers on Taiwan in a "counter-attack to restore the nation [al unity]" (fan-kung fu-kuo).[1]

Those wedded to the view that the U.S. can continue normal relations with Taiwan while "normalizing" relations with China will dismiss all this as the mad acts of a wild Chinese minority now happily removed from power. But that slighting of the evidence, while typical of a policy premised on illusion, misses what's at stake. The Chiang Ch'ing group apparently took up the cause of forcefully liberating Taiwan as part of an attempt to rally powerful people and popular sentiment to their side, a cause which seems popular in China. There really has been a nationalistic revolution there and the unsettled issue of Taiwan is an increasingly sore spot. Consequently, even after Chiang Ch'ing's removal from power, Chinese foreign policy people iterate her point: the Chinese do not exclude the use of force in resolving the issue.

The resurgent power of Chinese nationalism should have been apparent to all during the Cultural Revolution when Chinese beaten up in Moscow, returning from maltreatment in Burma or India, or from the horrors of the anti-Chinese pogroms in Indonesia became national heroes, and Chou En-lai's government was under siege for not sufficiently protecting the rights of Chinese abroad. Any student of Chinese politics today cannot but be impressed by the serious campaign continuously

mounted justifying Chinese claims to islands in the South China Sea, such as the Paracels and the Spratleys, or the way all Chinese rallied to Peking over an island dispute with Japan. Then, based on the evidence, it seems that political pressures in China are moving for nationalistic action on such issues, that inaction, experienced as betrayal of the sacred nationalist cause, will increasingly be most costly in Chinese politics. Do Americans who expect Chinese to understand popular pressures on the U.S. president comprehend the true magnitude of these nationalistic pressures in Chinese politics?

Only Americans with veils of illusion will not see that it is not at all unlikely that China may well chose eventually to move militarily on these issues where the Chinese side can bring to bear overwhelming force on a vulnerable opponent. Indeed, given the political pressures on Mao's successors to win popular support, to earn their legitimacy, and to act in tune with deeply held nationalistic commitments, it is not unthinkable that China make some moves to defuse Moscow-Peking tensions to make these nationalistic acts more militarily credible. While it is not odd that Teng Hsiao-p'ing, whose power grew as 1976 ended, was denounced earlier in 1976 for selling China out to Brezhnev and the Soviet Union, since all major losers in Chinese politics since 1959 have had similar charges brought against them, we shouldn't forget

that some outside observers also found that Teng had made overtures to the Kremlin, including the return, with unprecedented apology, of Soviet helicopter pilots.[2] Teng's military backers in China might well like to see a decrease in tensions on the Soviet borders and an increase in action on unresolved nationalist issues, such as the islands. The issue, however, is not Teng nor the Chinese military nor what happens tomorrow. Rather, it is whether the Chinese are in fact so locked in to hostility to the U.S.S.R. that they can gain no room for flexible maneuver on these other issues.[3] It is, rather, whether America is deluding itself in assuming that it doesn't matter if U.S. actions and inactions make the United States the enemy of Chinese nationalism, of China's territorial integrity.

Treating China's military-oriented, nationalist, revolutionary-based leadership as if military action were for them impossible, as if they were pacifists, may be an ennobling approach to politics, but it is again all illusion. What would Washington do if Peking moved to take the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu? Even in 1958, Washington had to bluff its way out of that one. It has no credibility on that issue today. And, I would suggest, it is not at all certain that the American people would rally to the idea of another U.S. military intervention in Asia on behalf of a side descended from the losers in an anti-imperialist, Asian revolutionary civil war. The illusion that China cannot

and will not act militarily obscures the fact that America may not be able to act militarily. Does the president really want to put massive American concerns, energies, and resources in that military direction? I doubt it. Perhaps believing that the Chinese are locked in is a way of hiding from ourselves how increasingly locked in to a dangerous policy is the American side.

THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN

Imagine the impact on Japanese politics of American illusions and paralysis combined with Chinese nationalism and successful Chinese military action on these disputed island issues. There could suddenly develop in Japan the feeling that America had deceived and betrayed Japan, the belief that, quickly and without permitting obstacles, Japan had to militarize and go nuclear for her own security. The harm such a mutation could spread is such that the odds against its appearance must be lengthened. How much better, with that goal in mind, to begin now in cooperation with ruling groups in Taipei and Tokyo to plan for the new world of Asia in a peaceful and more-or-less evolutionary manner.

The government on Taiwan must come to understand that it cannot in the long run count on U.S. military support. All the frantic efforts to imitate Israel in developing an arms--even a nuclear--capacity will not avail. Taiwan and the People's Republic of China should be urged to

turn their illicit trade into the real thing, which will bring lower-priced goods to Taiwan and win some goodwill for the government there. Cultural cooperation and exchanges, such as ending international chaos by sending one combined team to the Olympics, already proposed by Peking, should be encouraged. Such a course of action gets the U.S. out of the way, takes the issue out of the realm of powerfully felt anti-imperialist convictions in China, and places the matter within the parameters of cooperation and Chinese dealing with Chinese. While the outcome or the length of the cooperation cannot be predicted, at least it dampens the likelihood of explosive consequences.

Virtually no one expects the People's Republic of China to want to take Taiwan immediately. Taiwan is so very different socially and economically, Mao calling it an indigestible piece of meat. A desire to absorb it slowly and gradually need not be consummated for 100 or 200 years, according to China's former Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi. In American thinking, 100 years is forever. In reality, the gamble of cooperative normalization, while definitely a gamble, is more hopeful than the gamble of abnormal normalization leaving Taiwan open to the threats of an antagonistic, disappointed, and ultimately militarily vengeful People's Republic, and leaving Japan open to a sudden wrenching of its political forms and forces.

Pursuing this other course of abnormal normalization may impel a great capital outflow from Taiwan, force more tyrannical measures by that government against the people, lead to the welcoming of U.S. capital on terms more speculative and piratical than that of prudent concern for long-term investment returns and hence, in sum, foster economic deterioration on Taiwan. No matter what, the move toward normalization will engender changes in Taiwan, make left forces, pro-Peking forces, more likely, if not more legitimate.

Facing up to the uncertainties, trying to involve all parties on the difficult dilemmas ahead permits the American side to say to the Japanese side that, while America's nuclear umbrella for Japan is real, should Japan feel that now is a good time to do more militarily--even on the nuclear side--for its security, America would not object. Japan thus could gradually prepare itself with American cooperation for the problems ahead rather than suddenly one day see American perfidy as the cause of Japanese vulnerability. What is most important is discarding the illusion that no such large changes are required because abnormal normalization will change nothing. Policies premised on that illusion promise eventual explosions. The number of these complex and difficult issues not confronted in the usual discussions of abnormal normalization is one index of the unreality of that position.

Only by seriously moving on genuine normalization of relations with China can there be much hope of involving China in a peaceful settlement in Korea. Why should China help stabilize two Koreas when that precedent can help legitimate two Chinas? If Korea is the powderkeg most people insist it is, then winning China's cooperation in defusing that peninsula could prove a major gain from genuine normalization of relations with China.

Oddly, after all agree to the powderkeg nature of Korea, most analysts then slight it and move on to the "big picture." Yet it is obvious that China prefers a peaceful solution in the Korean peninsula. War there has many times threatened China over the last century. Since a military buildup in Korea would increase Pyongyang's dependence on Moscow, it is not surprising that Peking has facilitated initiatives to reduce the level of military tensions in Korea. And Peking well understands the desirability of resolving the dilemmas of Korea in a manner not conducive to great anxieties in Japan which could foster Japan's sudden, full remilitarization. Abnormal normalization has the obvious disadvantage that it helps guarantee and enhance all the worst possible outcomes in Korea by forcing Peking to stand only a step away from Pyongyang's most extreme demands.

Precisely because the course of events in Asia may prove far more unpredictably murderous than the established scenarios of the adherents of the policy of abnormal normalization who simply predict more of the same, the limited risks of genuine normalization must be adjudged as less dangerous than the actual and usually unnamed risks of abnormal normalization. We must abandon the illusion that America can do what it wants with Taiwan, that there is no way that China and America could be enemies again. If America plays the role of obdurate antagonist to Chinese nationalism, it is asking for some group within Chinese politics eventually to use that as an issue against its "soft-on-America" opponents. And then how easy it will be to remind the Chinese people that anti-China America imposed a vicious economic embargo on the Chinese nation, killed Chinese in Korea, stuck with the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek, refused Chou En-lai's handshake, and so on. The last item mentioned, the maltreatment of Chou, is only triply relevant because of the reverence for Chou fostered in China since 1976.

Indeed, in a 1977 biographical review of Chou's life published by China's Foreign Ministry, it was mentioned that "In 1955 Premier Chou did not concern himself about the bomb incident produced on the Prince of Kashmir airplane by U.S.-Chiang agents, did not concern himself about the serious threats to his safety . . ."[4] Probably few

Americans know about that time bomb set on this plane in Hong Kong, a plane borrowed from India to take part of the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference. According to the report of Indian intelligence, Chiang's agents got a mechanic at the Hong Kong airport who had relatives on Taiwan to help them place the bomb on the plane. Afterwards, Air America, the CIA's airline, flew the mechanic to safety in Taiwan. Fortunately, the downed plane carried an advance contingent and not Chou En-lai. While we hope the publication of the story of this event in China is not an ill portent of things to come, I hope it is a warning to those with illusions about inevitably easy and friendly U.S.-China relations to take off their rose-colored glasses.

And to the extent that it is true that the Chinese left was most anti-Soviet, shouldn't we expect their decline eventually to be followed by a decline in that antagonism as the centerpiece of Chinese foreign policy? If the Soviets were right in blaming Lin Piao for the March 1969 border incidents (he wanted to stop the rise of the Party, to stop the decline of the military, and to check the opening to the U.S. and a move to a more internationalist foreign policy), if it is important that Chiang Ch'ing's group singled out for glory and praise the heroes of those anti-Russia incidents, then how can it not weaken a pro-American stand when, with the fall of this left, the heroes of the Korean War and

of the anti-Chiang/U.S. war return to prominence?

SUMMARY

When these complex and still-developing issues are realistically faced, we find great global risks in abnormal normalization, yet great parochial political gains at home in the U.S., in avoiding the limited but necessary risks of genuine normalization. The most likely outcome seems to include, as it always has, concessions to these parochial forces and the relegitimation of illusions which blind leaders to the global dangers inherent in their domestic compromises.

Fighting over this issue of normalization takes attention away from the major forces rapidly redefining our era, the tremendous and tumultuous switch in international economic relations. Because these issues do not become primary, illusory solutions seem real. And as Britain once thought a commonwealth could save its empire, Americans look to a trilateral alliance to retain its position.[5] The hard truth is that that position is too costly, too murderous. Why isn't that cold war world hastily put behind us? Because the opponents of genuine normalization with their power bases in America can speak to the established prejudices of the cold war and beyond. Hence, they can make each step out of cold war rigidities most costly for the president. They can therefore assure a stopping point and concessions which preclude genuine normalization.

They can exhaust our energies in ways which prevent us from even asking if China and America might find overlapping interests in restructuring a better international economic order, which make us give great weight to profitable U.S. investments in Taiwan as if it were more important to earn foreign exchange that pays the costs of U.S. troops abroad than to see that money is invested in jobs and improvements in the U.S. The shameful, harmful reality is that we are forced here to try to establish the merits of genuine normalization as if it weren't obvious that the painfully constricting international entanglements which came out of nasty political deals within the U.S. weren't inherently chaining us to an incapacity to deal with the real issues of our time, leashing us to the dogs of war, the same bloodhounds that dragged us into Indochina. Consequently, the obvious must be overboldly painted on a large canvas so that those with illusions may see it.

In other words, the major loss of true American normalization of relations with China will be a loss of illusions. The major benefit will be the removal of roadblocks to peace and reality. The choice is between piling up more small logs on a rickety dam which eventually will be washed away in potentially murderous torrents or to stop being an obstacle and instead to allow the waters to begin to find their way into more natural courses so that the level of tensions will lower and a world more

in accord with the results of World War II, the victory of a nationalist revolution in China to unite and revive a great people, will finally be seen for what it is, a reality. And then, with the illusions gone, the realities of 1949 recognized, the United States can stop wasting its precious resources on imperial security and confront the extraordinary new economic dilemmas of the 1970's. Or at least, just maybe, American policy thinking can reach the late 1950's when it no longer could afford the costs of the military empire which came out of World War II. First things first. At least let's catch up to 1949.

No one disputes that the Chinese ruling group which removed Chiang Ch'ing from power prefers in the short run stable, peaceful, and friendly relations with the U.S. The issue is whether people in America will choose to act on the long-run interest of peace in Asia. Perhaps in that case the Chinese, who appreciate Nixon's courage more than do most Americans, could be asked to see the courage and vision required by a U.S. president to move on to genuine normalization and could perhaps be persuaded to cushion the president's landing at home by treating America as something very different from an economic supplier of last resort. The horrible fact that war and war, and yet again war, have drawn America bloodily into Asia in this century turns hope into realism. That is, we must insist on boldness and leadership. The bloody costs of

politics as usual, of short-run thinking and action, are all too apparent. What is required now is something unusual, the vision to challenge narrow political forces at home to achieve the enormous benefits of genuine normalization. In this nuclear age, the long run is the race that matters for the human race.

Notes

[1]*Renmin ribao*, February 4, 1977, p. 1.

[2]E.g., David Milton, "China, U.S. May Be Moving to Military Alliance," *Madison Capital Times*, April 24, 1976.

[3]Surely the Chinese will eventually ask themselves about the cost to their position in the Third World from opposing the U.S.S.R. on every issue. While Mao was alive, it is doubtful if anyone could honestly and openly discuss these difficulties with him.

[4]*Renmin ribao*, January 11, 1977, p. 2.

[5]Very explicitly in writing and thinking, the image of Britain as supposedly dominating the nineteenth century international world and guaranteeing peace and progress captures the thinking of Americans seeing their country as replacing Britain in its global role. At its broadest conceptual level, Wilsonianism and its subsequent offspring continue to seek answers to the questions: What did Britain do wrong (right)? How should America do it better (as well)?

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NORMALIZATION: MULTILATERAL IMPLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

We have come a long way since the beginning of the conference last night, moving from the excellent visual cum oral dialogue view of China of a group that spent seventeen days there, into this morning's analysis of the internal scene; and now we are focusing on the bigger picture--where China fits into "spaceship earth." Since foreign policies of governments are frequently in very considerable part a consequence of domestic concerns, it might be useful at this stage to look at the principal driving forces of China that affect its foreign policy.

CHINA'S DRIVING FORCES

The first of these, I would say, is the basic drive of the Chinese to reestablish their own territorial internal integrity, to eliminate

the outside influence--foreign domination--that in a century of weakness (from the mid-1800's to the mid-1900's) had imposed itself upon China.

The second major basic driving force--the driving force of the Chinese revolution--is the drive for greater egalitarianism and meeting the needs of the people. This is essentially a domestic drive, but it obviously has major implications on the international scene, in which the United States and the European nations are seen as the landlords of the world. It explains a favorite saying of the Chinese in various international forums in the mid-1970's: "There is great disorder under heaven; the situation is excellent." They have really enjoyed the days of global economic disorders since 1973.

The third driving force is for China to become a modern state. Chou En-lai has set a time goal for China to become a modern socialist state by the year 2000, with the attributes of industrialization and the standard of living that goes with that.

Much of the internal debate in China for the last twenty years can be seen through the eyes of these three driving forces. The "Gang of Four," for example, gave priority to what I call Force No. 2, the drive toward egalitarianism, and the concern with meeting the basic human needs of the people at the bottom and their participation in the structure. This faction tended to give a relatively low priority to Force

No. 3, the drive toward a modern state. They were very strong on Force No. 1, the elimination of foreign influence, tending to be more isolationist and internally oriented. Lin Shao-ch'i, who allegedly, and I would say was with that group, was more concerned with Force No. 3, how to make China into a modern state, particularly with reference to following the Russian socialist model. And then there is the in-between group of pragmatists, symbolized by Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the administrators, which is between these two extremes and which tried to cope with moving all three of these at the same time but with different priorities to each--for example, in giving less concern to the egalitarian concerns of the "Gang of Four."

As we look at relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States in these terms, it can be seen that we are currently locked in a fundamental conflict over the second driving force. We are, as I said earlier, seen by the Chinese as the landlords of the world; and frankly, in many ways we <u>are</u> the landlords of the world. There can easily be a fundamental conflict here between China's driving urge for egalitarian change and the superdominance of the world economy by the most affluent major state in the world which has had a major role in creating the rules and institutions governing the present order for the market-economy world. With respect to their first driving force, the

establishment of their national integrity, a basic conflict remains over the U.S. stand toward Taiwan and to a lesser degree over the U.S. role in the Western Pacific. On the other hand, we are no longer involved on the mainland of Asia, we are out of Indochina, and we are seen as a waning--a "paper tiger"--force in that arena. Thus, on the territorial integrity side, it is very clear that we are now the lesser of two evils with the U.S.S.R. being much more of a concern. The Chinese are looking primarily to the problems north of the Great Wall.

With respect to trying to make China a modern socialist state, the third driving force, I would say that the Chinese technocrats today see access to North American and European knowledge as being more important and more relevant than access to Soviet knowledge, although on the military side the ties to the U.S.S.R. must still be very strong. And the ties to imports of Western goods are now sufficiently deep today that 22 percent of China's exports last year were devoted to servicing the foreign debt created by importing more than they are selling. The Chinese are bringing in high-technology capital goods, such as more than $1 billion worth of fertilizer plants. So we see many areas of conflict between the U.S. and China, particularly on two of the three issues. The ties between us are indeed quite fragile.

Our ties are based at two different levels, governmental and public. At the governmental level, the common tie is our shared concern over the actions of the Soviet Union. The Chinese have a concern with the Soviet Union and we have a concern with the Soviet Union. It is at that level that Nixon reestablished ties; we also at that time had a concern with the Indochina War. At the public--the private citizen--level, the tie is quite different, and consists of a widespread admiration of what the Chinese have accomplished in the effective address of basic human needs while their society remains very, very poor. But both of these ties are very fragile. If there were any kind of détente between the U.S.S.R. and Peking, a distinct if not likely possibility in the foreseeable future, this would then really destroy the governmental tie that links us. And, as we are now seeing with the great concern over human rights in the United States, it is quite possible that at a certain point there would be a decision among the American people that we are more concerned with the freedom on the political side, freedom from oppression, than with the freedom from hunger on the economic side which, as noted above, is the basis of much of American admiration for China today.

Before turning to the global issues per se, I believe I would join with what Allen Whiting has said on a number of occasion

(and with which I disagreed fifteen years ago): essentially the Chinese militarily have not been in an aggressive posture over the last two to two and one-half decades. Their involvement in Korea, India, and Indochina was essentially defensive in nature. One could say, and probably correctly, that the Chinese were far more defensive than they needed to be, but there were some major psychological reasons after a century of foreign domination.

Wherever one travels in China, in every village, one sees the slogan on the walls "Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, never seek hegemony." There is a massive indoctrination campaign directed toward the people as to their threat from the outside, but, as the clause "never seek hegemony" seems to indicate, the tone is defensive.

A second point I want to make is that the Chinese, in looking at the outside world, speak of the countries outside of China in terms of three groups. There is the First World, and for them, the First World consists of the superpowers or, as they would call them, the super-imperialists: the United States and the U.S.S.R. Then there is the Second World, which is all the industrial countries in between: Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, for example, which are considered both exploiters of the world and which are also being exploited by the superpowers. And then there is the Third World, which coincides with the

more general use of the same term by our Western society.

THREE GLOBAL ISSUES

As we look at the global issues where the world interacts with China, very clearly the one that has been at the heart of Chinese relations with the outside world in the last twenty-five years has been security concerns. Americans call it the cold war, the East-West confrontation; they call it their confrontation with the outside world for their own survival. As I will indicate in more detail later, initially that confrontation was with the United States, as they tried to get us out of the mainland of China. But they now see this as a waning concern and the Russians as much more of a concern. Ideological conflicts have broken out between them, and what we might call the colonial issues, resulting from the Russian takeover more than a century ago of vast lands that were then under Chinese influence and control, remain. The Chinese concern with the U.S.S.R. is so dominant that, when one travels in China as we did, one constantly hears the Chinese at highest levels talking privately about their support for an active U.S. role and presence in NATO in Europe and for a retention of American participation in bases in Thailand and in the Philippines; in these areas they are afraid that if we pull out too precipitously, there will be a vacuum into which the Russians will move.

The one partial exception to this that we heard, an important one, was with countries that were divided, such as Korea; on that they are much more hostile, privately as well as publicly, to the U.S. position there. This, of course, bears some analogy to their concern with their own divided country, Taiwan being the division; they said repeatedly that whether it takes 100 years or 200 years or 1,000 years, they will be reunited.

I would argue that our normalization of relations on a bilateral level with Peking is terribly important in terms of our own cold war confrontation with the U.S.S.R. There is a great danger, the way our official links are based on common hostility to Moscow, that if there is a Peking-Moscow reconciliation, we will immediately become Peking's enemy number one, again with all sorts of consequences.

A second global problem is the North-South confrontation. This confrontation, which has been building up between the developing countries against the hegemony strength of the industrial countries, came to a head with the OPEC price increases of late 1973. In this North-South confrontation, the developing countries are arguing for a change in the system so that it is less discriminatory toward them than it is now. To some degree, although not to the extent that is frequently alleged, the Chinese have clearly identified themselves with the Third World. They

call themselves a Third World country, but having said that, the Chinese remain quite at arm's length from other Third World nations. Although they attend the meetings that the "Group of 77" developing countries have, they essentially do not play an active role; they have not joined OPEC.

In their rhetoric, they are highly critical of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as exploitive nations. They say that the word "interdependence" that we offer all the time as our explanation of why we must work with other countries is a tool of U.S. exploitation. They explain this by saying that yes, the world is interdependent and probably needs to be interdependent to some degree, but what kind of interdependence is there today that the United States is seeking to invoke? They claim it is like the interdependence of the horse and rider, and "we all know who the horse works for." They argue that there needs to be a different, more equal relationship between the developing countries and the developed.

At the same time, they continue to emphasize self-reliance, but in emphasizing self-reliance, they also make it clear that they are not for complete self-reliance; countries have to be dependent on others to varying degrees, small countries more than big countries, and the key again is the extent to which, in self-reliance in dealing with other countries, it's on the basis of equality.

As we look ahead over the years, I believe we can foresee a continuing confrontation with China in the North-South forums. However, as long as the Peking-Moscow confrontation remains, their attacks on us in these forums will probably be at a relatively low key. If there were a settlement with Moscow, we could expect the Chinese to come in in a very major way, stirring up the North-South confrontation with industrial democracies. Clearly, for us to reconcile this set of differences with the Chinese, the answer is for us to make major progress in our North-South debate with the developing countries. If this were removed, we would have removed a major, fundamental difference between us and the Chinese.

The third set of global issues that we and the Chinese are bogged down on are those that come out of the explosion of economic growth that has occurred over the last twenty-five years. The world has gone from a $1-trillion-a-year economy in the late 1940's to a $3-trillion-a-year economy (in constant dollars) in the early 1970's. As we treble global output, we begin to run into systems overloads in area after area, just as the housewife in the kitchen or a person in a toolshop putting in one-too-many appliances on a power outlet blows a fuse. Basically, we have been "blowing" a series of systems: the environmental system, with urban pollution, the putrification of lakes, and the decrease of the

world fish catch through harvesting fish beyond sustainable levels; the food system, with consumption of food outrunning the support systems so that we have actually had multi-year shortages; the oil system, with the demand for energy outrunning the long-term prospects for cheap oil, changing thereby the power of the OPEC cartel and leading to spiraling price rises for oil; and the monetary system. In effect, Peking would argue that the era that has served the industrial countries very well for the last twenty-five years has not served the developing countries very well and has outrun its time.

It is very clear that on virtually every major front the United States needs to participate in rebuilding new systems, whether in dealing with the oceans, dealing with atmospheric pollution, restoring the rise in the world fish catch, or getting a new world food system. It is not widely recognized that in 1973 and 1974 the breakdown of the world food system that we dominated contributed as much to the price rises during those years as did the breakdown of the oil system that the OPEC countries managed.

CHINA'S ROLE IN THE SOLUTION

Where do the Chinese fit into this? These are global problems. So far, the Chinese have largely abstained from participating in these arenas actively. They have been to the World Food Conference

and are a member of the United Nations, but they have not actively participated in, nor have they seriously thought about how to be a major participant in, dealing with many of these global issues. At almost every stop in our travels in China, we would raise the issue of what the Chinese thought of these global issues and how they planned to participate in them. In each case, they would take the point of view that they would deal with them pragmatically as they came up; it is clear, however, as illustrated by their performance on the world food front where they have a major stake, that they have not really thought through their role. They are relatively inactive in this forum. However, if you ask senior bureaucrats in Washington if they have thought about what the role of the Chinese ought to be in these problems, they would say that they haven't thought about it in any depth either.

The population of the U.S.S.R. and China comprises one-quarter of mankind. Looking ahead twenty-five years from now, as we will go from the $3-trillion world of the early 1970's to something which would be in the $8- to $10-trillion world of the year 2000, unless the global system breaks down on us, it is clear that we cannot make them work without both Russian and Chinese involvement. This is one of the major challenges that still lies ahead.

Finally, there is the major issue of whether or not China can be seen as an example for others. I agree with those who say there is not one Chinese mode. There are many changing patterns in China, but the Chinese experience does have a great deal to offer to both developing and developed countries at a time when I think most people would agree that we are coming to the end of a multi-century era in which, since the industrial revolution, the West seemed to have the answers. We are coming to an era when the Western societies are reexamining the validity of more and more goods as the prime objective of growth, and more and more urbanization as the pattern for progress; at the same time, it is very clear in the developing countries that the models that they are borrowing both from the capitalist West and from the Marxist West are not working adequately for China. Many of these countries are achieving high growth rates, but they are also suffering from high income disparities, growing unemployment, massive urban migrations, food problems, and population problems; it is increasingly clear that they are going to have to grope for new models that build more on their particular circumstances.

Given this warning, there is much relevance in the Chinese experience for those looking for new patterns of approaching problems. First of all, to one visiting China after an absence of nearly thirty years, I was struck by the fact that the Chinese are the first modern society to

be modernizing "in place," in the rural and small-town areas. The Western pattern of modernization has been to urbanize. They are practicing a major new approach to modernization by leaving people essentially where they are. By the end of the century, some 90 percent of the Chinese will still be within fifteen to twenty miles of where they are now located. There will not be a massive rural-urban migration.

Second, the Chinese have given priority to the address of basic human needs to a degree that is unprecedented among major societies. In this, they have substantially exceeded what the Soviet Union did in its approach to development in the 1920's and the 1930's.

Third, and possibly most important, they are the first of the post-World War II societies, the first of the societies in the last 100 years, to develop their own pattern of development that goes back very heavily to their own roots, and that does not seek to essentially be a copy of a Western model. Ataturk sought to make Turkey a European country, displacing Turkey's historic religion and culture, including the Arabic script. Almost as extreme, the Shah of Iran is seeking to make Iran into a France. But the Chinese, after their failure with a massive absorption of Russian doctrine and concepts in the early and mid-1950's, begin in the late 1950's and early 1960's to return massively back to reliance on indigenous values; almost every one of their major innovations

has a major component that is very Chinese. For example, Mao and his Little Red Book really are not too different from the Chinese religions that have been centered more on man than on a god, from Confucianism based on the sayings of Confucius. Maoism is very much a twentieth-century succession to Confucianism. As another example, their whole concern on meritocracy fits into a traditional Chinese value; although it used to be through academic scholarship tests, merit was the basic historical way of getting access to high posts.

There are, of course, major cavaets to the usefulness of the Chinese experience. Some parts of the Chinese experience are quite readily transferable--the use of paramedics, for example. But there are very important parts of it that are not readily transferable to other societies, e.g., the whole commune system and the massive, disciplined restructuring it required was politically possible only because of power shifts that followed twenty years of civil war. Also, as we look for experience patterns and models, it's worth remembering that there are models other than the Chinese Communist one. We tend to forget that Taiwan is in many ways the most successful result of adaptation to changed conditions of any developing country since the end of World War II. It is the most egalitarian non-Communist country in the world today. It has combined improved welfare and high growth to an extraordinary

degree. Sri Lanka is a country which has followed a different approach from either and, with only half of China's per capital GNP, has better life expectancy and lower infant mortality.

Finally, as we look to the Chinese experience of revolutionary change, I want to make a point that is worthy of a whole separate discussion. I frankly believe that the United States is today--and has been during the past ten years--the most dynamic, the most pluralistic, the most rapidly changing society in the world. During the time when the Chinese were going through a cultural revolution from the mid-1960's to the early 1970's, we too were going through a cultural revolution of our own on a comparable scale and all very people-oriented, initiating the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the free speech movement, the life-style change, the environmental movement, the end of the Vietnam war through people action, and the Watergate ousting of a president. We Americans have an incredibly pluralistic and dynamic society. But this is a long way of getting back to my original point, which is that the Western model of development that people all had in their minds twenty-five years ago, fifty years ago, has run its course, is running its course for the West, and clearly is not adaptable for many of the developing countries. We need to grope for a whole set of new approaches to dealing with the problems. Some of the Chinese experience is relevant to us,

and even where it is not, it should jar us into understanding that other approaches are possible.

CONCLUSION

Let me then conclude on the note that normalization of relations between the United States and China will need to come at many levels. There are questions of normalization of form and normalization of substance. Questions of form, if they are too long delayed, can become questions of substance. The question of Chinese membership in the United Nations has now been normalized. But the Chinese have not yet reached the point where on many of the substantive issues dealt with in the UN forums, e.g., energy and trade, the Chinese are normalized. On the bilateral side, conversely, we have done a lot of normalization on substantive issues, but we have not yet done so diplomatically because of the key issue of Taiwan. In my judgment, something major has to, and can, be done with respect to the Taiwan issue; that will permit resumption of full diplomatic relations between Peking and Washington without sacrificing the basic ability of those on Taiwan to determine how they want to live. That is the topic of a separate discussion.

One final point in closing. China was effectively separated from the Western world through most of recorded history. The first century of close relationships, from the Opium War to the then-Japanese

occupation leading to World War II, was disastrous for China. The Chinese Communists have been in a hostile relationship to one or the other or, for a decade, to both Western superpowers. In this increasingly interdependent world, an end objective of the United States policy is to seek a China, with its one-fifth of mankind, that has "normalized" relations with both superpowers. Only then can we deal adequately with the increasingly difficult world problems that face all countries as the twenty-first century nears.

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TAIWAN:
FUTURE OPTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

My assignment was to address Taiwan's future options. I would like to suggest that this will be done in a very academic way, namely, I will address the options which have been advanced in the American literature, in the American debate and argument, without respect to their feasibility. In the course of examining these options, you may infer what the feasibility of these options are. I think it's important to do this because the catalog of options in the U.S. press and in the U.S. public mind over the past year has actually expanded. New options are advanced; old options are revived. So let me begin by disassociating myself from this list of options as a sequential priority list because it has been drawn largely from the public record. I would, however, emphasize

the point that Professor Friedman made throughout his presentation. The feasibility of options on Taiwan is a function of domestic politics, not only in the United States, not only in the People's Republic of China, but on the island of Taiwan itself. So there is not going to be an imposed solution by statesmen or scholars designing the ideal future world. It's going to be generated by the interaction of domestic politics within each of these three points and among these three points.

OPTION ONE--STATUS QUO

The first option, the simplest one to identify, is, of course, the status quo continuing into the future whereby there is a Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China on the mainland, each expressing itself as "China," both agreeing they are engaged in a civil war over that issue. This certainly can continue on the island of Taiwan until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek. Ching-kuo assumed formal and public power when his father died in April of 1975, but his power had been anticipated by his father's gradually increasing his authority over the previous years. There is no basis for assuming that before his death he will formally abdicate responsibility to acquiesce in the change in the island's status, nor is he likely to be confronted with a hostile Taiwanese leadership that will permit him to leave peacefully. After Chiang Ching-kuo's death, which is certain

but uncertain in time (he is presently in his mid-sixties, he has diabetes, he maintains a very active life, but that is a finite future), I personally do not foresee any possible successor regime maintaining the Republic of China as the status quo.

I could be wrong. When I went to Taiwan on my first period of residence in December of 1953, I certainly would not have foreseen my ability to return there in 1974 under the Republic of China's auspices. But I do not see a leader with the capacity that Ching-kuo has to control the secret police, the armed forces, the Kuomintang, or the Nationalist Party, and simultaneously to have the public support which he has developed as a leader who moves freely and far throughout that society. Ching-kuo's capacity to do this is a function in part of his father's mantle; he inherited Chiang Kai-shek's place. It's also, however, a function of his own unique political ability, both to move within the elite circles of the Nationalist regime and to move in the public levels of the factory and the farm. He is not simply a Mandarin official nor is he simply a secret police authority.

There are no other Nationalist mainland leaders with that combination, and the Kuomintang itself would seem to fragment upon Ching-kuo's death. His brother Chiang Wei-kuo has been speculated upon by outside groups as a possible successor. Wei-kuo has had none

of the political experience and has little of the political ability. As the funeral ceremonies of the late Generalissimo passed on the television screen, Chinese commented very frankly, "This is the end of the line." The sons of the sons of the Generalissimo can never succeed in the Chinese sense. Chiang Ching-kuo's wife is Russian. His children therefore are, in the Chinese sense, not Chinese. Chiang Wei-kuo's wife is Japanese. His sons are not Chinese. These are very essential elements of what constitutes legitimacy. The status quo, then, can continue for only a short-lived future, certainly not to the year 2000.

OPTION TWO--"REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN"

The easiest transfer in our mind of symbols is from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan, an option which is theoretically possible. But how to get to there from here is a much tougher question. Some have suggested a plebiscite for self-determination. If this island of 16 million people has 14 million who are Taiwanese, then a referendum should determine their will. But as I have already indicated, Chiang Ching-kuo is not going to terminate voluntarily the Republic of China's existence by opening up that possibility. He is committed to implementing his father's will. His cohorts are mainlanders; none of them are going to give up their jobs, their status, and their fortunes for the sake of a referendum. The arrests in the last year of such

Taiwanese who have spoken of this possibility signify a determination and a will to foreclose that option. Is it going to come about through the United Nations? Not with the People's Republic of China on the Security Council opening up the prospect of losing its own sovereign integrity and its own territorial right. Is it going to be imposed by the United States? Not in any way that's conceivable to me.

Will the Republic of Taiwan come about through a coup, a putsch, or a revolution? A coup or a putsch requires command over the instruments of violence. While the Taiwanese, being in an overwhelming majority, staff all of the noncommissioned officers and many of the lower levels of the officers in the armed forces, they are not in the top positions. They do not command in particular the key elements of the Taiwan Garrison Command, the armored forces, nor the air force. Without command over those key elements, a successful coup or putsch is inconceivable.

A revolt? Not on the evidence of the last thirty years of Nationalist occupancy. The celebrated incident of February 1947, which resulted in the slaughter of perhaps 10,000 Taiwanese, did not begin as a revolt. It began as a spark in a street situation very much like Watts or Detroit or Newark, where the existing tensions between the societal segments erupted through misadministration, but it was not in the genuine

sense a revolt. The mainlanders hold the keys to the use of force, and the Taiwanese have not shown themselves prone to that choice of action. One main leader put it to me in a very crude way. He said, "When we had to move into Szechuan in World War II and set up a capital in Chungking, we had a very tough time. We had to jail thousands of Szechuanese and shoot hundreds. They were tough. But Taiwanese? They've rolled with it; they're pretty simple to manage." I wouldn't put it in such callous terms, but in terms of outside expectations, the Taiwanese independence movement on the island has no possibility of revolt.

Will the Republic of Taiwan come about in some other fashion after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo? Ching-kuo has steadily moved into higher levels of political authority those Taiwanese that he thought would be cooperative. So far, that political system has moved within its constitutional framework of legitimacy, spurious as it may be in its international context. The ascendancy after the Generalissimo's death was done by constitutional means. One may then assume that when Premier Chiang Ching-kuo dies, the deputy premier, a Taiwanese, might well be an acting authority. Some kind of evolution, rather than revolution, might bring about a Republic of Taiwan at that time. It's not for us on the outside to design it or to define it. But to suggest it as a more-

likely prospect than the others, I think, reflects a consensus of analysis.

OPTION THREE--REUNION WITH THE MAINLAND

The third option, and the one about which the majority of attention has focused, is that of reunion with the mainland. How is this reunion to come about? The mainland insists that it has the legitimate right to use force. It will not renounce the use of force as its legitimate sovereign right within the civil war and within a framework where both sides agree they are China. But let us look at that right to use force in terms of a likelihood to use force. After all, the People's Republic of China has had almost thirty years to design the instruments by which to liberate Taiwan. Yet, at least in the foreseeable future, its capacity seems to minimize the likelihood of force being used. There are a hundred miles of water between mainland China and Taiwan. Any of you who have taken the boat passage across that channel knows that it can be fairly stormy sea. From June to November, typhoons are increasingly likely, and a typhoon interrupts that passage for most seaborne vessels for days or longer. The winter monsoon begins in November and makes it again a very rough passage. The only landing coasts for invasion are relatively limited and easily defended.

The army on Taiwan has at least 300,000 combat effectives. These are Taiwanese; they have no affiliation with the mainland. If they

do not particularly like Nationalist rule, they will certainly be hostile to Communist rule and all that implies for what they see as their economic future under communism. A massive defection or a massive breaking of that will to defend cannot be counted on by the mainland armies. Normal calculations of an invasion force against the well-entrenched defending group call for ratios of at least two to one or three to one. We are talking here of an invasion force over a hundred miles of rough water in the neighborhood of perhaps a million troops. The Nationalist capacity to resist is much more impressive than the Communist capacity to attack. The Communists can lift over that Taiwan Strait perhaps 60,000 to 70,000 troops by sea and air and sustain them in combat.

What about the air force? Obviously, the thousands of planes on the mainland could overwhelm the air force of the Nationalists. But the vision of Taiwan being bombed into submission or being nuclear missiled into submission is ignorant of sensitivities as to what this is all about. Taiwan is not an enemy bastion to be battered into submission; it is a brotherly island to be rejoined with the mainland with a minimum of human cost. Also, the economic cost to Taiwan could wreck this valuable prize. If Taiwan were joined with the mainland peacefully, it could with one stroke almost double the mainland's foreign-trade-earning capacity. The figures vary from year to year, but in general, Taiwan's

foreign-exchange-earning power is approximately equal to that of mainland China. To destroy its technology and its infrastructure by prolonged air attack would cripple, if not kill, the goose that lays this golden egg.

Blockade? Taiwan is dependent upon foreign trade for its economic livelihood. Could it not be strangled to death by the sea lanes? It sounds simple but Taiwan's links to the outside world are not through the Taiwan Strait, which is easily dominated by the Chinese Communist navy. They rather are more tied to the West Pacific sea routes to Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States. One can talk about submarines of the People's Republic but, when one looks at the capacity of Taiwan to sustain itself through convoy and through transfer of equipment from the United States which is presently under way, one sees that it could be a very long, arduous task to blockade Taiwan and to starve it to submission. In the meantime, of course, the question arises of the reaction of other nations trading with China who value their economic ties both to Taiwan and to the mainland, Japan and the United States in particular.

The offshore islands might be used as blackmail. Quemoy and Matsu are within easy range of Chinese Communist shipping and air power. On those offshore islands, for which we ran the risk of war in the mid-1950's, are perhaps 100,000 Taiwanese troops. Their families on Taiwan are not likely to support their being held as hostages between

Peking and Taipei in a Chinese civil war. It is conceivable in some future situation that the mainland may choose not to bombard these islands into the sea but to blockade them from Taiwan. This would offer leverage on Taiwan, for which they could say, "All is forgiven. Let us have amnesty. Let us unite." The pressures on the mainland regime in Taipei from its Taiwanese population could be very serious. This is a more worrisome and, I think, not entirely hypothetical future, but one which is not immediately at hand.

Could reunion come by an embargo on trade with the states that trade with Taiwan? It has been threatened in Peking at different times informally at low levels; it was formally raised at one time between Peking and Tokyo but never implemented. It is sometimes suggested that if Peking were to stop trading with any countries that traded with Taiwan, the effect on Taiwan could be catastrophic. This is only true, however, if those countries agreed, but in no case is a country's trade with Peking so much more vital than its trade with Taiwan as to make this a credible threat. The dependency between Peking and these countries, however, is very serious for the goals that have been enunciated earlier by Professors Lardy and Friedman and Mr. Grant. This might be tried, but I do not think it would succeed.

In short, reunion with the mainland, should it come about, is going to have to be through negotiations across the Taiwan Strait from the peoples on both sides, and that depends upon the domestic politics of mainland China and Taiwan. There are precedents for these negotiations to occur. The Shanghai capitalist community negotiated with the Communists. The Communists wanted these capitalists to help manage the industry and technology so they guaranteed them compensation through bonds. They paid off the interest rates even while China was at the brink of starvation in the early 1960's. They did not renege on their promises. They did not execute the capitalists in a double-cross after they had them where they wanted them.

The analogy with Tibet is sometimes raised. I think this is wrong on several points. Tibet was negotiated with initially, but ultimately the institutions and the autonomy of Tibet were crushed, in part because of internal revolt, in part because of domestic politics in China outside of Tibet. But the ability to tolerate Tibet as a special area was quite different from the possibilities of Taiwan being tolerated as a special area. Tibet borders countries that had penetrated China repeatedly to subvert Chinese rule in Tibet. Whether it was the British at the turn of the century or the Americans and the Chinese Nationalists from 1949 to 1971, genuine Tibetan autonomy spelled a possible loss of Chinese

sovereignty. Tibet was also proximate to other non-Tibetan areas. Why should the Tibetans have a special deal and be exempt from the rules and regulations that were imposed on these other areas? Conceivably, should these negotiations occur, Taiwan would count on a different future. There is no history in Taiwan of a surge for independent status as there has been in Tibet. There is no history of Taiwan's being the "cat's paw" of foreign subversive agents seeking to dominate it or separate it from Chinese rule. And Taiwan is not simply across a land border, where differences of life-style and of living standards could cause unrest and resentment. I am not predicting this as an outcome but am only trying to point out why those Americans who have suggested Tibet as an analogy do a disservice to the very cause that they profess to advance.

CONCLUSION

When we saw Teng Hsiao-p'ing, he made very explicit the sense of his desire to have the United States remove itself from the Taiwan problem immediately. With regard to his time frame within which reunion would be acquired, Teng repeated a Chinese formulation in terms of ten years or a hundred years or longer to wait for that time of reunion. Fortunately, there has been no timetable in Peking. But this issue is a sensitive one in the politics of Peking. The degree to which there is a sense that the United States is willing to remove itself from this problem

and that there is some kind of commitment to which we are living up is a political issue to which even Chou En-lai felt vulnerable. There is no one as preeminent in Peking politics today as Chou En-lai. So I suggest that it is not a question of past politics between the "Gang of Four" and Chou En-lai. It is going to be a question of continuing politics in Peking. The sooner we sensitize ourselves to this within the administration and within the body politic, the sooner we will be able to support the kind of policy which will not equate a change with "abandonment of Taiwan," which will not forecast a "bloodbath" in Taipei, which will not see that Saigon imagery of our leaving today and the Communists taking over tomorrow, but which will see this as a problem that will have to be worked out over time between the Chinese.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ALLEN S. WHITING is a Professor of Political Science and an Associate with the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He received his A.B. degree from Cornell University in 1948. Dr. Whiting received a Russian Institute Certificate and an M.A. degree in 1950 and his Ph.D. degree in 1952 from Columbia University. Since 1968, he has been a Consultant to the Department of State and, since 1973, a member of the Board of Directors of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Among Dr. Whiting's numerous publications are: China and the U.S.: What Next?, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, April 1976; and The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indo-China, University of Michigan Press, 1975. Between 1974 and 1975, he visited the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA - A CONGRESSIONAL VIEW

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INTRODUCTION

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with the distinguished panelists and guests today the subject of "U.S. Policy Toward China--A Congressional View."

At the outset, let me make clear that when anyone refers to a "congressional view" on a matter such as this, there is not just a single view. Perhaps one could say that there are 435 views in the House and 100 in the Senate, and that these may not always be the same from one week to the next.

Nonetheless, there are some general observations which I would like to make concerning legislative considerations and the process of formulating our China policy.

One important consideration, in my view, as we move ahead on a China policy is the need for a rather broad consensus on the major outlines of our strategy and goals. What we do in this area is of concern to a great many Americans--certainly to many members of the House and Senate--and for such a policy to be successful over a period of time, it needs to have broad bipartisan support.

All who are present today are well aware of bitter recriminations over China policy which ensued in this country in the late 1940's and for some time thereafter. I am not saying that the Truman-Acheson policy deserved the severe denunciations hurled at it. However, my point is that where we can, we should avoid the types of actions which could set off a bitter debate and undermine policy before it is set.

THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS

I think it is highly important in order to reduce such chances of divisiveness that the president and the secretary of state maintain close contact and consultation with the Congress as we move forward in our relationships with China. They should also articulate better than they have to date the precise gains expected from normalization.

The administration has done rather well so far, in my opinion, in discussing some areas of foreign policy with the Congress. However, we have not had much consultation with the administration on a

China policy to date. Secretary Vance is planning to go to Peking later this year; I would hope and expect that he and the Congress would consult with one another in advance about the options which might be most appropriate for his mission.

I certainly hope to hear a more intelligent discussion from the Carter administration on the benefits we should expect to see.

It is, of course, a presidential prerogative to undertake diplomatic initiatives, such as recognition of or breaking off of relations with a foreign government. In the Nixon opening to China in 1972, tight secrecy prevailed up to the moment of announcement. The "Nixon shock" effect is still felt in the capitals of some of our Asian allies today. The current circumstances regarding China do not warrant such secrecy or surprise, certainly not another "Nixon-type shock."

The principal questions which must be considered are well-known. And in respect to the need for consultations with the Congress, the administration will have to keep in mind not only the desirability of a broad-based consensus but also the particular legislative requirements which may come into play. For example, if the United States were to enter into "normalized" relations with Peking and break official ties with Taiwan, this would have an impact on fifty-nine treaties and executive agreements presently existing between the United States and the Republic of China.

There are laws and agreements covering a wide range of matters, such as most-favored-nation treatment, settlements on blocked assets and private claims, aid and credits, aviation rights, and fishing. It cannot be overemphasized that the fulfillment of some of the obligations entailed in these laws and agreements will continue to be in our national interest, no matter what our relationship with the People's Republic becomes. As we move toward normalization, we have to ask, What would be necessary to assure fair protection for the large U.S. business investments in Taiwan? What do we do about the agreements relating to the disposal of nuclear materials which we now have with the Republic of China?

These are issues that probably can be worked out, but only insofar as the legislative aspects are concerned, only if there is substantial congressional support for the China policy being proposed.

There is little pressure on Congress to review legislation pertaining to China for the time being because the present diplomatic situation does not require legislative implementation. At the same time, there is significant congressional sentiment--which you all have heard expressed--that we not "abandon" our long-time ally, the Republic of China. In the last Congress, more than fifty members of the House of Representatives co-sponsored a concurrent resolution in favor of continued

close relations with the Republic of China.

FOREIGN POLICY--"THE NATIONAL INTEREST"

There is a well-embedded congressional tradition of taking a thorough look at a U.S. foreign policy to see if it is truly in the national interest of the United States.

As matters now stand, we have a treaty commitment with the Republic of China which is part of the fabric of our security relationships in Asia, to which both parties have lived up.

We have in the area of one-half billion dollars in business investments in Taiwan. Our trade with Taiwan was $3.5 billion in 1975, seven times greater than that with the People's Republic of China.

Also, Americans have many cultural and personal relationships with our friends on Taiwan. We do not want to see their economic gains and relative freedoms damaged by U.S. diplomatic action.

The major question is, Can we have "normalization" with Peking without abandoning Taiwan? And if we don't, will Peking reverse course and move into a close relationship with Moscow?

THE TONE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

We should remember that it is the People's Republic of China, not the United States, which is setting the price for establishment of full diplomatic relations.

It should be pointed out that Peking also seems to be setting the style of the normalization process. U.S. presidents have gone to Peking, but up to now, no comparably high level official from the People's Republic of China has yet visited Washington. To date, cultural and educational exchanges are one sided and far fewer Chinese have experienced life in the United States than Americans have in China. Since 1972, fifteen congressional groups have gone to China and eight have facilitated in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué; there have been no comparable Chinese "parliamentary" visits to Washington in return.

If Peking continues to insist that we discard Taiwan in the process of "normalization," we had better move very slowly and carefully.

I do not believe that by exercising such care, we will be driving Peking into the arms of Moscow. The rivalry between the two Communist superpowers is too deep and their mutual suspicions too great. Sino-Soviet conflict has deep historic roots that won't be overcome by quick diplomatic action. The long mutual border, with troops on both sides, will loom as a line of division, not union, for years to come.

The Chinese themselves are well-known for taking the long-term view in their foreign policy and for patience in carrying it out. They don't seem to be in a continual hurry.

I well remember an answer I received when I was in China in 1974. A Peking official was telling me about their program to phoneticize the written Chinese languages. I asked him, "How long will it take? Five years?" "No," he said, "200 years."

Perhaps we can use some of the same patience and steadfastness in our dealings with them. And in the process, I hope the president and the secretary of state will take care to consult fully with the Congress.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

THE HONORABLE CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI is Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations and Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. He was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the Fourth District of Wisconsin in November 1948, and has been reelected each term since then. Mr. Zablocki was Chairman in October 1963 of a Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia (see House Report No. 893, 88th Congress, 1st Session). He visited the countries of Korea, Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China from April 11-22, 1974.